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The construction of a definitive counterfactual is key for a properly rigorous 
assessment of the impacts of any policy change, whether in our field of Economics, 
or elsewhere. In simple terms, we do not just ask the question “what happened?”, 
but instead “what happened compared to what would have happened anyway?” A 
well-established predicament is that we cannot observe both treated and untreated 
outcomes for the same set of individuals over the same time period: you are either 
affected by the policy, or you are not.  
 
The experimental ideal would be the evaluation of the effectiveness of policies 
using large-scale and carefully constructed randomised control trials (RCTs), 
though this is often prohibited by cost, practical, or ethical considerations. 
Researchers have therefore developed a variety of econometric techniques to derive 
statistically sound counterfactuals in the absence of the experimental ideal. A 
relatively recent development to this end has been the Synthetic Control Method 
(SCM), as developed by Abadie et. al. (2003) and Abadie et. al. (2010), which is a 
data-driven approach to deliver a ‘synthetic’ version of the treated observations 
post-treatment using a weighted combination of the untreated regions, based on 
observed pre-treated outcomes.  
 
Chapter 2 utilises the Synthetic Control Method and LFS data to assess the impact 
of immigration from the Additional Eight (A8) accession countries to the European 
Union on domestic wages in the U.K. I also propose a new method for pooling 
unitary authorities in LFS data into stylised local labour markets. Consistent with 
the literature, I do not find evidence of a negative wage impact (coefficients are 
small but significant, and positive). I find some suggestive evidence that, consistent 
with Manacorda et. al. (2012), that wage impacts are most positive for native males.  
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In Chapter 3, I use extensions to the Synthetic Control Method, as developed by 
Cavallo et. al. (2013) and Galiani & Quistorff, (2017) to conduct a comparative 
case study on five expansions of the Oyster Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) contactless 
payment system for public transport in London. I evaluate impacts on passenger 
demand, house prices, unemployment, traffic, and pollution. I find significant 
positive impacts on passenger demand where the price change is greatest for peak 
commuters; I find no significant impact on passenger demand where the price 
change is small, so we implicitly find no evidence that the convenience of 
contactless PAYG ticketing plays a role in increasing demand. I find no evidence 
of significant impacts on house prices, unemployment, traffic, nor pollution. 
 
Deviating from SCM to construct a counterfactual in experimental conditions, 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of risky incentives in the workplace. We present a 
randomised experiment in which we compare the performance of subjects 
participating in a real effort task. Participants are allocated to groups of 5, but work 
individually. In the first treatment, subjects receive a bonus in the form of a piece 
rate for performing above a minimum performance threshold. In the second 
treatment, subjects receive a bonus that is 5 times higher than the value of the piece 
rate, but will only be received with a probability of 1 in 5. Lastly, in the third 
treatment, we create a group lottery by combining all the bonuses earned by the 5 
players in the group into a single lottery prize, and allocating the group prize to one 
group member at random. In all treatments subjects are anonymous and able to 
observe the productivity of the other members or the group. Although we do not 
obtain significant difference between the three treatments in the point estimates, the 
group lottery always performs better than the other treatments, and, controlling for 
observables productivity growth over time in both lottery treatments is significantly 
higher than for the piece rate. We speculate that seeing someone earning a high 
prize incentivises subjects to exert more effort, although risk averseness and 
observing a high performance from their peers work as discouraging factors in the 




2. Impact of A8 Migration on 






This paper uses the Synthetic Control Method to assess the impact on wages in U.K. 
local labour markets most affected by post-accession A8 migration. There exists a 
general consensus in the literature that the overall effect of A8 migration on labour 
market outcomes is negligible; this paper contributes to that literature by comparing 
results obtained using the Synthetic Control Method to Spatial Correlation 
estimates, and testing whether local labour markets disproportionately affected by 
the policy were more affected by the policy. I also propose an alternative method 
for pooling LFS unitary authorities according to observed commuting 
characteristics, as opposed to geographical proximity.  
 
In May 2004 the European Union enlarged to encompass ten additional nations. 
Eight of these nations, the “Accession Eight” (A8) nations, were formerly part of 
the Eastern Bloc and had significantly lower per-capita income than the rest of the 
EU (Dustmann, Casanova, Fertig, Preston, & Schmidt, 2003). Britain was one of 
just three member states not to exercise an option to apply initial restrictions on 
freedom of movement of labourers from the A8 nations, along with Sweden and 
Ireland (Lemos & Portes, 2008). As a result, large numbers of A8 nationals became 
economic migrants to the U.K.; 580,000 A8 nationals registered to work in the U.K. 
between May 2004 and December 2006, with an estimated additional 200,000 
arrived to work on a self-employed basis over the same time period (Ruhs, 2007). 
This gross inflow was of a scale far exceeding that estimated before the policy 
change; a study commissioned by the Home Office (Dustmann, Casanova, Fertig, 
Preston, & Schmidt, 2003) bounded the estimates at 5,000 to 13,000 per year, 
basing their estimates on the assumption that all member states would lift inflow 
restrictions simultaneously.  
 
Standard neoclassical theory dictates that this represents an exogenous labour 
supply shock, resulting (ceteris paribus) in an outward shift in the labour supply 
curve, a higher absolute level of employment and a lower wage rate. However this 
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result does not account for general equilibrium effects; clearly a larger population 
has implications for aggregate demand within the economy, which has its own 
implications for labour demand. Taking such general equilibrium effects into 
account, the theoretical result become ambiguous, which is reflected in the 
empirical literature. An influential study by Card (1990) (discussed in more detail 
in the Literature Review below) argued that the stochastic nature of the supply 
shock to the Miami labour market resultant of Mariel Boatlift meant it could be 
treated as a ‘natural experiment’, as there was no potential for the Miami labour 
market to adjust in anticipation of the influx, and famously found no statistically 
significant wage impacts. Similarly, A8 migration to the U.K. is often treated as a 
natural experiment in the literature (Ruhs, 2007), (Lemos & Portes, 2008), as whilst 
the policy change was anticipated, its scale was not.  
 
Lemos & Portes (2008) assess the impact of A8 migration to the U.K. by correlating 
the change in A8 shares in geographically defined regional cells with changes in 
labour market outcomes (known as spatial correlation), and find no statistically 
significant impact on wages. A criticism of this approach is that because migrants 
rationally select into higher-wage regions, there is a spurious positive correlation 
between migration levels and wages thus inducing positive bias in spatial estimators 
(Borjas, 2017); this is also known as simultaneity bias. The authors test for this by 
instrumenting with lags of A8 migrants, and find that their estimators do not change 
significantly. However Ruist, Stuhler, & Jaeger (2017) argue that instrumenting 
using migration lags does not generate unbiased estimators on the basis that the 
spatial distribution of migration inflows is relatively static over time, thus violating 
the strict exogeneity assumption required for Instrumental Variable estimators to 
be consistent. In his recent re-evaluation of the Mariel Boatlift, Borjas (2017) 
proposes the employment of the Synthetic Control Method (SCM); this data-driven 
method uses weighted averages of numerous untreated regions to generate a 
synthetic placebo region with a labour market characteristically similar to the 
treated region, against which post-treatment outcomes can be compared. Crucially, 
because the treated region and the synthetic placebo are similar in terms of 
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observable labour market characteristics, the influx of migrants is argued to be a 
quasi-experiment, negating the possibility of selection on observables, in turn 
meaning simultaneity is unproblematic. This paper employs this methodology in 
the context of A8 migration to the U.K. to test the conclusion of Lemos & Portes 
(2008) that A8 immigration has little effect on local area labour market outcomes.  
 
Whilst in the U.K. all regions were by definition affected by the enlargement of the 
EU, regions can be identified with similar labour market characteristics yet with 
very different patterns of net A8 inflows; indeed there is a large body of evidence 
to the effect that migrants do not select into regions entirely based on labour market 
conditions (Bartel, 1989), (LaLonde & Topel, 1991), (Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston 
& Wadsworth, 2003). Similarly to Card (1990) and Borjas (2017) in their analyses 
of the Mariels, I compare regions that were highly affected by the A8 influx to 
regions with similar labour market characteristics that were not. Given the 
consensus in the literature that the effect of A8 migration on U.K. labour market 
outcomes is negligible, focussing on the areas most affected by the change in this 
way provides a powerful test to this conclusion.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Evidence from the United States 
There is a considerable body of evidence on the impact of immigration of wages in 
the U.S. using a variety of methodological approaches, with somewhat 
heterogeneous findings.  
 
Card (1990) used matched difference-in-difference methodology to analyse the 
impact of the Mariel Boatlift on labour market outcomes (wages and 
unemployment) in Miami. In April 1980 Fidel Castro made a surprise 
announcement to the effect that Cuban citizens were permitted to emigrate should 
they wish to do so; as a result, between May and October of the same year 125,000 
Cuban citizens emigrated from the port of Mariel to the nearest U.S. landmass, 
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Miami. David Card used the unexpected nature of the Mariel Boatlift in 1980 to 
argue it constituted a ‘natural experiment’: because the policy change in Cuba was 
unexpected, it represented a significant exogenous shock to labour supply for which 
there was no scope for the Miami labour market to react in anticipation of the 
policy. Further, because Cuban migrants selected into settlement in Miami on the 
basis of its geographical proximity to Cuba as opposed to economic factors, this 
eliminated the potential for simultaneity (the difficulty in identifying the impact of 
migration on labour market outcomes where the spatial distribution of migration is 
dependent on the same variables on which those outcomes are measured). Matched 
difference-in-difference methodology was used to estimate the impact of the 
boatlift on Miami labour market outcomes, comparative to a counterfactual of 
outcomes in nearby control cities with characteristically similar labour markets. No 
significant impacts on outcomes for blacks, hispanics, nor existing Cubans in 
Miami were identified, and a small positive wage impact was identified for whites. 
These results were surprising to economists, as neoclassical theory dictates that 
(ceteris paribus) a large exogenous supply shock such as this should exert a 
significant negative impact on wages and/or a positive impact on unemployment. 
 
Following Card (1990), numerous papers have found similar results when assessing 
the impact of immigration on wages in the U.S. using different methodological 
approaches. The difference-in-difference methodology employed by Card relies on 
the assumption that there is no regional selection by migrants on observables, which 
is arguably reasonable in the Mariel case but less so in more general contexts 
(Borjas, 2017). As such, spatial correlation became a popular tool to assess the 
impacts of immigration, e.g. LaLonde & Topel (1991), Altonji & Card (1991), 
Butcher & Card (1991), Borjas, Freeman, & Katz (1996), Card (2001). Spatial 
correlation analyses multiple regions, with each region essentially ‘treated’ to 
differing extents dependent on the extent of immigration to that region, and a 
treatment effect is identified from the correlation between the magnitude of 
migration to that region and changes in outcomes (controlling for other 
explanatories); in other words, the counterfactual becomes a region similar in other 
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aspects but differing in the degree of immigration flows. The modal finding in this 
literature is that treatment effects are not significantly different from zero, or small 
and heterogeneous, with unskilled natives and existing migrants most likely to be 
adversely affected.  
 
A criticism of both of these reduced form approaches is that they are uninformative 
as to the causal processes driving the results, in that they do not capture partial nor 
general equilibrium effects (Gibbons & Overman, 2010). Further, simultaneity is 
problematic in spatial correlation techniques: migrants are more likely to select into 
high-wage regions, resulting in a spurious positive correlation between high-
immigration regions and wages (Borjas, 2017). As such, a variety of structural 
approaches have been proposed, some of which are described below. 
 
Borjas, Freeman & Katz (1992) treat different types of worker, defined according 
to nationality and skill level, as different factors of production in a Cobb-Douglas 
setup, and compare returns to each factor to a counterfactual constructed using an 
estimate of the elasticity of substitution between each factor. Conversely to the 
papers described above, large and significant negative wage effects were found for 
unskilled labourers. The authors later repeated their study with the same data using 
spatial correlation methodology (Borjas, Freeman, & Katz, 1996), and found 
similar results. However perhaps the most important contribution of this paper was 
to spatial econometrics, as they found the size of their estimator was positively 
related to the geographical size of the region pools on which the spatial regressions 
were estimated. 
 
A number of studies have similarly employed structural approaches to estimate 
partial equilibrium effects using estimates of the elasticity of substitution using U.S. 
data, finding similar results. Borjas (2003) finds large negative wage effects for 
unskilled natives, small negative wage effects for semi-skilled natives, and no 
significant effects for skilled natives. Borjas, Grogger & Hanson (2006) find the 
impact of immigration on the probability of an individual being unemployed is 
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larger for blacks than for whites. Borjas (2006) shows that when there is an influx 
of migrant PhD graduates to a local economy there is a significant (though 
heterogeneous across discipline) negative impact on existing PhD graduate wages, 
indicating that wage effects are dependent on the skill group being competed with 
as opposed to being a phenomenon specific to the low skilled.  
 
This approach, however, has been criticised on the basis that it is reliant on the 
assumption of perfect substitutability between units of labour within the categories 
into which the authors place them. Ottaviano & Peri (2012) replicate the 
simulations in Borjas (2003), but relaxing this assumption, allowing for imperfect 
substitution between natives and migrants using U.S. census data. Contrary to the 
findings of the original paper, they find a small positive impact on the wages for all 
native groups aside from unskilled natives, for which a small negative impact was 
found.  
 
Weyerbrock (1995) calibrates a computable general equilibrium model to estimate 
the macroeconomic impacts of immigration to E.U. member states from the former 
Soviet Union. Despite very large inflows to the E.U. as a whole (of around 1.7 
million per annum), small negative labour market impacts are identified only in 
experiments where annual immigration is large (between 3.5 and 7 million), and 
small positive labour market impacts are identified in member states where wages 
are more flexible.  
 
Boeri & Brücker (2005) use a similar approach to predict the labour market impacts 
of the 2004 EU enlargement on pre-accession member states. They find that a 1% 
increase in the size of the labour force will result in only a 0.5% reduction in wages, 
owing to increases in GDP per capita in the host country.  
 
2.2.2 Evidence from the United Kingdom 
The first comprehensive study specifically on the impact of immigration on U.K. 
labour market outcomes is Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston, & Wadsworth (2003). The 
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authors primarily use spatial correlations to establish the impact of migration on 
wages and unemployment in the U.K. between 1981 and 1991, using Labour Force 
Survey and census data. The study finds small positive wage effects on existing 
workers resultant of immigration, and no statistically significant effect on 
unemployment.  
 
Dustmann, Fabbri, & Preston (2005) uses spatial correlations with LFS data 
between 1992 and 2000 to investigate the impact of immigration on native labour 
market outcomes; the authors find positive but insignificant wage effects for all 
education levels, and no significant effects on unemployment. Similarly, 
Dustmann, Frattini, & Preston (2007) use LFS data from 1997 to 2005 to look at 
the impact of immigration on native wages using spatial correlations, and find a 
small but significant positive effect for native males, though the authors note that 
results are heterogeneous across education levels, and that it is less than clear what 
demographic of natives migrants compete with in the labour market on the basis 
that skilled migrants more likely than natives to be employed in unskilled 
occupations.  
 
Lemos & Portes (2008) is the first major analysis to focus specifically on the effects 
of A8 migration to the U.K. on native wages and unemployment rates. 
Unemployment is measured using Jobs Seekers Allowance administrative data; 
wage data is obtained from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE); A8 
inflows are measured using Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) data; control 
variables that explain native employment outcomes are derived from the LFS. Once 
again, the authors use spatial correlations to estimate the impact on A8 inflows on 
native outcomes, and no significant effect is identified.  
 
Manacorda, Manning & Wadsworth (2012) is probably the most comprehensive 
analysis of the long run impacts of immigration in the U.K. Similarly to Ottaviano 
& Peri (2006), the authors construct a stylised model of labour demand which treats 
migrants and natives as separate factors of production within each age and 
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education category, estimating the elasticity of substitution between migrants and 
natives, and using a simulation-based approach to estimate the impact of 
immigration on wages. Spatial cells were defined by both geography and skill level 
in a “skill-cell” approach, thus allowing for imperfect substitutability between 
migrants and natives with different skill levels. The paper finds that immigrants and 
natives are imperfect substitutes, new migrants are, on average, better educated than 
natives, and any negative wage effects of migration are thus borne by existing 
migrants, particularly more recent migrants.  
 
A full review of the various methods employed, and the results yielded, is provided 
by Dustmann et. al. (2016). 
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.3.1 Data 
British Labour Force Survey (LFS) data is used from Q3 2001 to Q4 2006. Analysis 
beyond 2006 is complicated by the further expansion of the EU into Romania and 
Bulgaria in January 2007, representing a second ‘treatment’; unlike after the 2004 
expansion the U.K. did this time exercise its right to exercise staggered restrictions 
on freedom of movement, and it is more difficult to reasonably argue the influx 
resultant of the 2007 expansion represents a natural experiment due to the recent 
experience of the 2004 expansion. Further, there is potential for regional impacts 
of the 2008 recession to be heterogeneous, such that (given this paper constructs 
counterfactuals geographically) inclusion of data in 2008 and the immediately 
ensuing years might compromise internal validity.  
 
The LFS is a rolling panel survey of around 0.5% of the total population, submitting 
a questionnaire to 60,000 households, which amounts to around 140,000 
respondents. Each household is followed for five consecutive quarters, with ‘core’ 
questions being asked each quarter, and ‘non-core’ questions which vary from 
quarter to quarter. The survey collects data on household characteristics, economic 
activity, and health status.  
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The LFS is used to construct the measure of migrant stocks in this paper. An A8 
migrant is defined for the purposes of analysis in this paper as an individual who 
was born in one of the A8 nations, but now resides permanently in the U.K. Other, 
non-survey-based measures of migrant flows exist, such as National Insurance 
Number (NINo) registrations, and Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) data. 
Lemos & Portes (2008) employ WRS data in their analysis of the A8 impact on 
U.K. labour market outcomes, although the authors note the difficulty in drawing 
any inference as to migrant stocks over time using flow data, because A8 outflows 
(even for recent migrants) are nonzero; Pollard, Lattore, & Sriskandarajah (2008) 
find that A8 migrants are more likely to return to their home countries within a short 
timescale comparative to other migrants. Using LFS data to measure migration, 
however, is not without its drawbacks; Rendall, Tomassini, & Elliot (2003) 
compare unweighted LFS estimates of changes in migrant stocks to 1991 and 2001 
Census data, and find that the LFS underrepresents growth in migrant stocks by 
around 26%. Rienzo & Vargas-Silva (2017) suggest this is due to the fact that the 
LFS only surveys those living in traditional households, and excludes people living 
in hotels, caravan parks and various other heteroclite arrangements. When 
aggregating regional data this paper uses person weights, which are calculated by 
the ONS to give higher weight in aggregation to underrepresented demographics1.  
 
The Labour Force Survey divides data geographically into 409 unitary authorities 
(local government constituencies), 49 counties and 12 regions. For the purposes of 
this study unitary authorities, as the most disaggregated measure, are combined 
according to observed commuting habits to generate representative local labour 
markets.   
 
 
1 PWT14 accounts for underrepresentation in terms of age, gender, and region in 
the LFS comparative to Census data.  
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2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Migrant Stocks  
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the share of A8 migrants in the labour force over 
the time horizon studied. Prior to the 2004 accession migrants from A8 nations were 
subject to the same labour market restrictions as non-EU migrants: full time 
students were permitted to work up to twenty hours per week during term time, and 
others were permitted to work only with a work permit, obtainable by those 
possessing “key skills” which were deemed to be in short supply, or those who were 
provably sufficiently wealthy to support themselves independently (NOP Business 
& Institute for Employment Studies, 2002). The graph shows that A8s steadily 
accounted for approximately 0.25% of the total labour force until the EU 
enlargement in Q3 2004, after which this figure sharply rose to around 1.3% by the 
end of 2006.  
 
Figure 2.2 shows the share of A8s in the labour force as a proportion of all migrants. 
It is clear that before the A8 accession A8s represented a relatively constant share 
of migrants (around 2.5%), but post-accession they represented a significantly 
increasing share, rising to around 14% in 2006 Q3.  
 
This is roughly in line with the rapid increases in A8 workers estimated using the 
flow data described above. The Home Office (2007) estimated 444,000 A8 
migrants registered to work in the U.K. between May 2004 and December 2006. 
This would represent roughly a 1.4 percentage point increase in labour force share 
over this time period, though this does not account for A8 outflows, nor registrants 
who did not actually settle in the U.K.. Figure 2.1 shows approximately a 1 









Table 2.1 shows broad occupation groups for natives, A8s and non A8 migrants 
before and after the accession. For natives and non-A8 migrants these are relatively 
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constant. For A8s the share in ‘Professional’, ‘Associate Professional & Technical’ 
and ‘personal service’ occupations decreased significantly, whilst the share of 
‘Process, Plant & Machine Operatives’ and ‘Elementary Occupations’ doubled.  
 
This is particularly interesting in the context of the education data presented in 
Table 2.3 below. Whilst on average new A8s have at least as many years of 
education as natives and existing migrants, they appear to select into lower skill 
work.  
 Pre-Accession  Post-Accession 
 Natives A8s Non-A8s Natives A8s Non-A8s  
Managers & 
Senior Officials 
14.1% 7.0% 15.9% 14.9% 4.5% 15.3% 




13.4% 11.6% 15.4% 13.8% 4.9% 16.0% 
Administrative & 
Secretarial 
13.6% 6.8% 11.1% 12.9% 5.5% 9.8% 
Skilled Trades 12.0% 15.5% 7.3% 11.5% 15.3% 7.2% 
Personal Service 7.6% 15.3% 7.0% 8.0% 8.5% 7.9% 
Sales & Customer 
Service 
8.1% 4.6% 6.4% 8.0% 4.8% 6.8% 
Process, Plant & 
Machine 
Operatives 
8.2% 7.3% 7.5% 7.6% 14.7% 7.0% 
Elementary 
Occupations 
11.89% 18.45% 12.34% 11.12% 36.17% 12.26% 
Table 2.1: percentage of natives, A8s, and non-A8 migrants in each major occupation group pre- and post- 
accession. Pre-Accession period Q3 2001-Q1 2004;Post-Accession period Q2 2004-Q4 2006.    
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Age 
Post-accession A8 migrants are significantly younger than existing A8 migrants, 
other migrants and natives. Table 2.2 shows the age-groups of those of working age 
and in the labour force for all three groups before and after the A8 accession. 
 
 Pre-Accession  Post-Accession 
 Natives A8s Non-A8s Natives A8s Non-A8s 
16-20 9.7% 8.8% 5.7% 9.9% 6.3% 5.3% 
21-30 16.8% 36.2% 22.4% 16.1% 53.7% 22.2% 
31-40 23.8% 22.2% 28.0% 22.2% 20.6% 28.2% 
41-50 21.2% 18.0% 23.8% 22.3% 11.6% 23.4% 
51-60 28.4% 14.7% 20.0% 29.5% 7.7% 20.8% 
Table 2.2: percentage of natives, A8s, and non-A8 migrants in each age group pre- and post- accession. Pre-
Accession period Q3 2001-Q1 2004;Post-Accession period Q2 2004-Q4 2006.    
 
Native and non-A8 migrant ages are essentially unchanged before and after the A8 
accession, however the population share of the 21-30 age-group among the A8 
population living in the U.K. increased by 17.5 percentage points, indicating that 
the bulk of post-accession A8 migrants were within this range. It is not possible to 
accurately observe which observations are ‘new’ migrants using the LFS, however 
this result is consistent with the literature; Lemos & Portes (2008) find that 82% of 
new WRS registrations over the same time period were aged between 16 and 34.  
 
Education Levels 
A8 migrants are similarly educated to other migrants, and on average have around 
2.5 years more education than natives. New A8 migrants appear to be at least as 
educated as existing A8 migrants. Mean education levels are shown in Table 2.3.   
 
The LFS does contain data on the highest qualification attained, however most 
qualifications attained at foreign institutions are classified as “other”, so it is not 
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possible to carry out comparative analysis on highest educational attainment. See 
Manacorda, Manning & Wadsworth (2012) for a fuller discussion of this issue.  
 
 Mean Years of Education  
Natives A8s Non-A8s 
Pre-Accession 12.35 (2.40) 14.84 (3.29) 14.31 (3.20) 
Post-Accession 12.19 (2.46) 14.90 (3.33) 14.44 (2.88) 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
Table 2.3: Mean years of education of natives, A8s, and non-A8 migrants pre- and post- accession. Pre-
Accession period Q3 2001-Q1 2004;Post-Accession period Q2 2004-Q4 2006.     
 
Wages 
Figure 2.3 shows gross hourly pay for natives, A8 migrants and non-A8 migrants. 
Non-A8 migrants earn around £1 per hour more than natives, though this is not a 
surprising result given migrants are on average more educated, as described above; 
this may also be driven by the fact that migrants settled disproportionately in 
London, where (partly due to London Weighting) there exists a wage premium. 
Both series are on an upward trend, with wages increasing at roughly the same rate; 
there are no obvious kinks around the A8 accession in Q2 2004. 
 
Initially A8s are paid somewhere between natives and non-A8 migrants, but there 
is a decreasing trend across the series. It is not immediately clear what is driving 
this; one would expect to observe a decrease in mean A8 earnings post-accession, 
as the new migrants are younger and select into less skilled occupations, however 
it is not clear what is driving the decreasing pre-treatment A8 wage trend. It should 
be noted, however, that because A8s represented such a small share of the pre-
accession labour force that the pre-accession subsample size is small.  
 
It is important to note that a drop in mean A8 pay is not necessarily representative 
of new A8s competing with existing A8s in the labour market. Whilst new A8s 
appear to be educated to a similar level as existing A8s, it is clear from the statistics 
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on the occupations of new A8s presented above that new entrants are more likely 
to select into low-skill occupations; the decrease in mean A8 wages might therefore 





Figure 2.42 shows unemployment rate series for natives, A8 migrants and non-A8 
migrants. Over the time horizon the native unemployment rate is relatively flat, at 
around 5%. Non-A8 migrant unemployment is also relatively constant, varying 
between around 7% and 8%. 
 
 
2 This graph, and others in this paper (where denoted as such)  plot a local 
polynomial smooth of the outcome variable on time (using Stata’s lpoly 
command). This is purely for visual clarity of the trends, net of seasonality.  
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Once again, there is significant variation in the aggregated A8 data owing to the 
relatively small number of A8s in the labour market. Unemployment is trending 
downwards for A8s before and after the accession, and there is no obvious structural 
break in this trend around the point of the 2004 accession.  
 
Figure 2.4 
Dispersion of Settlement  
 
Table 2.4 shows the percentage of all A8 migrants and all other workers living in 
each region before and after the 2004 A8 accession. The geographical dispersion of 
non-A8s is remarkably constant, whereas the dispersion of A8s changes quite 
significantly post-accession. Prior to 2004 the vast majority (80.9%) of A8s were 
settled in London and the South East. Post-accession London and the South East 
still had the largest concentration of A8s (53.9%), however large numbers settled 
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in other regions, such as the East Midlands (8.3%, an increase of 6.7p.p.) and West 
















Tyne & Wear 0.3% 0.8% 0.5% 1.7% 1.7% 0.0% 
Rest of Northern 
region 
0.7% 0.7% 0.1% 3.1% 3.2% 0.1% 
South Yorkshire 0.4% 1.6% 1.2% 2.0% 2.0% 0.0% 
West Yorkshire 2.1% 5.8% 3.7% 3.5% 3.5% 0.0% 
Rest of Yorks & 
Humberside 
0.6% 2.6% 2.0% 2.7% 2.8% 0.0% 
East Midlands 1.6% 8.3% 6.7% 7.2% 7.3% 0.1% 
East Anglia 3.1% 4.7% 1.6% 3.8% 3.8% 0.0% 
Inner London 28.0% 20.8% -7.3% 4.9% 4.8% -0.1% 
Outer London 32.0% 19.1% -12.9% 7.6% 7.5% -0.1% 
Rest of South East 20.9% 14.0% -6.9% 19.9% 19.8% -0.1% 
South West 3.1% 3.9% 0.8% 8.5% 8.5% 0.0% 
West Midlands (met 
county) 
2.3% 3.2% 0.9% 4.1% 4.1% 0.0% 
Rest of West Midlands 0.4% 2.2% 1.8% 4.8% 4.7% 0.0% 
Greater Manchester 0.3% 2.4% 2.1% 4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 
Merseyside 0.5% 0.3% -0.2% 2.1% 2.1% 0.0% 
Rest of North West 0.4% 1.7% 1.4% 4.0% 4.0% 0.0% 
Wales 1.0% 1.4% 0.4% 4.6% 4.7% 0.1% 
Strathclyde 0.7% 1.1% 0.4% 3.6% 3.6% 0.0% 
Rest of Scotland 1.4% 3.0% 1.6% 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
Northern Ireland 0.2% 2.2% 2.0% 2.6% 2.6% 0.0% 
Total 100 100  100 100  
Table 2.4: regional settlements of A8 migrants and all other workers pre- and post-accession. Pre-Accession 
period Q3 2001-Q1 2004;Post-Accession period Q2 2004-Q4 2006.     
 
2.4 Identification Strategy 
This paper utilises the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) as developed in Abadie, 
Diamond, & Hainmueller (2010) in similar vein to Borjas (2017). The obvious 
difference between the A8 influx into the U.K. and the Mariel Boatlift is that the 
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Mariels settled almost exclusively in Miami due to its geographical proximity to 
Cuba, whereas A8 settlement in the U.K. was more widely dispersed (see Figure 
2.4 for the geographical dispersion of A8 migrants pre and post accession). 
However the assumption Card (1990) and Borjas (2017) implicitly make is that 
there is no economically driven reason why Mariels settled in Miami as opposed to 
the control regions identified, that is, an individual migrant would have faced the 
same expected wage rate and probability of being unemployed infinitesimally 
before the policy change in any of the control regions as they would in Miami. 
Indeed, there is a significant body of evidence indicating that regional settlement 
decisions are based in part on non-economic factors, e.g. Bartel (1989), LaLonde 
& Topel (1991), Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston & Wadsworth (2003). This paper 
makes the same assumption for A8s in the UK: ‘control’ regions are identified 
where there is no increase in A8 settlement after the policy change, and these are 
matched to ‘treated’ regions, which did experience a significant increase, with 
similar labour market characteristics prior to the policy change.  
 
2.4.1 Identification Challenges 
Selection on Observables 
Selection on observables is probably the most difficult challenge to overcome: 
clearly new A8 migrants do select their region of settlement. This assumption is 
required for the conditional independence assumption to hold, which is essential 
for causal interpretation of the estimators derived below (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
Regional selection by new migrants on the basis of wage rates would be particularly 
problematic here: if new migrants select into higher wage regions, and therefore 
comparatively lower wage regions are used to construct a synthetic control group, 
any estimator of the effect of migration on wages derived through double 
differencing between ‘treated’ regions and the synthetic control region would be 
positively biased (Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston & Wadsworth, 2003). This is known 
as simultaneity: the researcher wants to observe changes in wage rates resultant of 
changes in regional migration, where in practice regional migration is being driven 
by wage rates.  
 32 
 
The same argument can be made around unemployment. There is a strong 
theoretical negative relationship between unemployment and wages (Blanchflower 
& Oswald, 1994), and so if new migrants select into regions where they perceive 
there to be a low probability of being unemployed, this would create an inflow of 
workers into regions where wages are likely to rise.  
 
Using synthetic control methodology, it is possible to construct a single control 
group that is characteristically similar to the treated group(s) in terms of the 
explanatories on the outcome variable (here, hourly wage). This means pre-
treatment trends in the treated regions and their respective synthetic control regions 
are almost exactly similar, the inference being that in the absence of the policy post-
treatment trends should be similarly congruent. In the context of wages, regional 
unemployment rates are not specified as a control due to reverse causality; for this 
reason treatment and ‘donor’ control regions are matched according to 
unemployment rates immediately before A8 accession, as is described in more 
detail below. This does still allow for the possibility of post-treatment variation in 
wages between treated and synthetic control regions resultant of migration, and 
therefore the potential for simultaneity in periods after the initial treatment remains. 
However given the donor control regions are chosen because they are flat in terms 
of pre- and post-treatment A8 shares, this does not detract from estimation of the 
regional treatment effect of the policy.  
 
Spillover Effects 
Regional labour markets are not closed economies: trade occurs between those 
economies, and labourers can move between them. If A8 migration is found to have 
a negative impact on regional wages, natives or existing migrants might move to 
other regions thus biasing any estimator of the regional effect of immigration 
(Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston & Wadsworth, 2003).  
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A recent study for the U.K. (Home Office & BIS, 2014) finds very little evidence 
of this, which is consistent with evidence from elsewhere in Western Europe (e.g. 
Martins, Piracha, & Varejão (2012)). Andrews, Clark, & Whittaker (2008) note that 
interregional migration is particularly modest in the U.K. comparative to other 
developed economies, but is most prevalent amongst high-skill males owing to the 
fact that relocating is costly, and the cost of moving is less likely to be offset by the 
gains in employment outcomes in the low paid. Given the majority of A8 migrants 
compete in the low skill sector (Lemos & Portes, 2008), this is unlikely to be 
problematic for this study.  
 
It should be noted, however, that workers do not necessarily have to relocate to take 
up a job in another region: they can choose to commute. This could be a source of 
spillovers for the same reasons described above. For this reason I define local labour 
markets in terms of areas within which there is a high propensity of commuting; 
this process is described below.  
 
2.4.2 Defining Local Labour Markets 
Ideally the regional data aggregation should represent local labour markets, as 
defined by the geographical areas within which individual workers commute to, 
and search for, work (Lemos & Portes, 2008). The Labour Force Survey 
fractionates data geographically into 409 unitary authorities (local government 
constituencies), 49 counties and 12 regions. In practice unitary authorities are 
unlikely to represent local labour markets, particularly in the case of large cities 
which are broken up into numerous unitary authorities but within which workers 
routinely commute. Lemos & Portes (2008) propose that aggregating at the county 
level provides a more realistic representation of local labour markets, assuming that 
workers are willing to commute to other unitary authorities within their county. 
However this fails to account for the large number of workers who live near county 
boundaries, and the increasing trend towards long distance commuting (Nielsen & 
Hovgesen, 2008). There are also a significant number of ‘commuter towns’ with 
high speed rail links to major cities such as London, in which a significant 
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proportion of residents work in a city which is geographically distant, but very few 
work in unitary authorities in between that town and the city in question; further, 
very few workers who live those in-between unitary authorities work in that city. 
 
I therefore construct stylised local labour markets (LLMs) by pooling unitary 
authorities according to the conditional probability of working in a particular 
unitary authority whilst living in another. The mathematical argument is as follows.  
 
Let ℛ = {$!, $", … , $#} be the set of all unitary authorities $, and	) ⊆ ℛ	be the set 
of all local labour markets, so ) = {)!, )", … , )#}. Each local labour market )$ 
consists of + ≥ 1 unitary authorities $%, such that )$ = {$!, $", … , $&}.  
 
Now let .'! be a binary indicator for an individual working in unitary authority $%. 
Let /'"! be a binary indicator for an individual living in some other unitary authority 
$(% ≠ $%.  
 
)$ ≔ 2$% 	: 	$% ∈ ℛ 	567	Pr:.'!;/'"!< ≥ =	>?$	@?AB	$% ∈ )$C 
= = 7.5%3 
 
= is chosen such that it is small enough to generate pools with a reasonable number 
of unitary authorities, but large enough for the pooled unitary authorities to 
meaningfully represent local labour markets; 409 unitary authorities are pooled into 
148 stylised local labour markets. In practice not all unitary authorities are pooled 
with others where there is very little interregional commuting, but these regions are 
primarily remote, rural locations, which were largely unaffected by A8 migration. 
 
 
3 Clearly the size of LLMs generated will depend on the choice of =. Ideally, 
results for a range of values of = would be presented, however this process is 
extremely computationally heavy. I propose that regardless of the chosen value of 
=, this represents a better method for pooling unitary authorities than on 
geography alone.  
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2.4.3 Treatment and Control Local Labour Market Identification 
Treated LLMs, and ‘donor’ control LLMs which are used to construct the synthetic 
LLM, are identified from the set of local labour markets described above. Treated 
LLMs are identified by testing for a structural break in the LLM-specific simple 
linear regression of A8 stocks on time (measured in quarters) at the point of the 
policy, in a sample restricted to observations in the labour force (those aged 
between 16 and 65 and are either in employment or unemployed and active seeking 
work, as per the ILO definition). A Wald test for a structural break at the point of 
A8 accession is then performed using Stata’s ‘estat’ command, the null hypothesis 
being no structural break at the point of the policy change. Regions with a p-value 
of greater than 0.1 are identified as potential ‘donor’ controls; these regions are then 
analysed graphically to ensure the trend in A8 stocks is relatively flat across time. 
Similarly, regions with a p-value close to zero are identified as potential treatment 
regions, and are analysed graphically to ensure trends in A8 stocks are relatively 
flat prior to Q2 2004, and that the structural break identified represents a notable 
increase in A8 stocks after Q2 2004.4 
 
From the sets of LLMs identified above, LLMs with a significant post-accession 
A8 influx are chosen as ‘treated’ regions for analysis. In practice most LLMs were 
significantly impacted by the policy, so four LLMs with a large sample size and 
relatively flat pre-accession A8 stocks are selected for analysis. In addition, the 
sample size (when restricted to those in the labour force) needs to be sufficiently 
large to generate meaningful results where the sample is further restricted to age 
and skill groups; as such LLMs with sample size of less than 4,000 were rejected. 
Four suitable ‘treated’ LLMs are identified, and these are labelled A-D in Appendix 
B. Similarly, ten donor control LLMs are identified with flat pre- and post-
accession A8 stocks, subject to the same sample size restrictions, and these are 
labelled 1-10 in the Appendix B. 
 
4 This approach lends itself to the comparison of the most treated to the least 
treated LLMs, which is the goal of this study.  
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2.4.4 Synthetic Control 
The Synthetic Control Method (SCM) was first proposed by Abadie & Gardeazabal 
(2003). The authors investigate the effects of conflict in the Basque Country on 
GDP per capita.  Problematically the region differed substantially from other 
Spanish regions in terms of the theoretical determinants of growth, such that there 
did not exist a valid counterfactual. The authors proposed a ‘synthetic’ control 
region, constructed using a weighted combination of other regions, which would 
resemble the Basque country in terms of pre-treatment characteristics. A negative 
impact on GDP per capita was identified, of a magnitude in keeping with the 
literature.  
 
SCM was first employed in the context of assessing the impacts of immigration on 
local labour markets by Borjas (2017), where a synthetic control region is 
constructed using March-CPS data to reappraise the impact of the Mariel Boatlift, 
as first analysed by Card (1990). Contrary to Card’s findings, a significant negative 
wage impact of between 10 and 30 per cent is identified for Miami high school 
dropouts, the group with whom the relatively unskilled Mariels were assumed to 
compete in the labour market. Borjas does, however, emphasise that this result is 
sensitive to the set of predictor variables chosen to construct the synthetic 
counterfactual. For this reason, as a robustness check in addition to the main results 
I present results of specifications with a variety of predictor variables, as discussed 
in more detail below.  
 
Peri & Yasenov (2015) replicate the estimations of Borjas (2017) using ORG-CPS 
data, which contains a larger sample size and measures wages more precisely. The 
authors argue that the measurement error within the March-CPS data as used by 
Borjas is significant enough to account for the wage effects estimated, and find no 
significant difference between wage outcomes for unskilled Miamians and the 
synthetic counterfactual. Borjas (2016) contests that the differing results found by 
Peri & Yasenov (2015) are driven by a synthetic control group derived from a 
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different set of control regions, and the inclusion of hispanics in the sample. Further, 
Peri & Yasenov include workers aged 16-61, whereas Borjas restricts the sample 
to those aged 25-59 to mitigate the possibility of those still in education being 
misclassified as high school dropouts.  
 
The construction of the synthetic control regions in this paper closely follows 
Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010), and makes use of the ‘Synth’ extension 
package for Stata as written by the authors. An excellent overview of the mechanics 
of the method is provided in Abadie (2020), which is set out below in the context 
of the application in this paper.  
 
There exist H + 1 LLMs, which are denoted J = 1,2, … , H + 1, where the ‘treated’ 
LLM is denoted J = 1 and all J > 1 are donor control LLMs. The data span M 
periods, and periods denoted M) occur before A8 accession. For each LLM, J, and 
time, N, we observe log hourly wages logR$*, henceforth denoted S$* for ease of 
notation. For each LLM J, we also observe T predictors of the outcome, 
U!$ , U"$ , … , U+$ which are independent of A8 accession. The T × 1 vectors 
W!, W", … , W,-! contain the values of predictors U!$ , U"$ , … , U+$, and the T × J 
matrix W) = XW"…W$-!Y therefore collects the values of the predictors for the H 
untreated LLMs. S$*# is defined as the expected post-treatment outcome in ‘treated’ 
LLMs in the absence of treatment, and S$*.  the observed post-treatment outcomes in 
treated LLMs. The effect of the A8 accession on treated LLM outcomes is 
therefore: 
 
Z!* = S$*. − S$*# 
 
Clearly S$*# is unobserved. The SCM method estimates S\$*# using one or more 
untreated LLM that had similar characteristics to the treated LLM in the observed 
pre-treatment period. The synthetic control group is defined as a weighted average 
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of the LLMs in the donor pool. A synthetic control can be represented by a H × 1 













$0" = 1, and .$ ≥ 0, so synthetic control groups are weighted averages of 
donor LLMs. Given a set of non-negative constants b!, b", … , b+ (the derivation of 
which is discussed later in this section), optimal weights ]∗ = :."∗, ./∗, … , .,-!∗ <′ 
are chosen to minimise: 
 
‖W! − W)]‖ = d_b2
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20!




subject to ∑ .$
,-!
$0" = 1, and .$ ≥ 0. The estimated treatment effect is therefore: 
 





g = (b", b/, … , b+) is chosen such that the synthetic control ](g) minimises the 
mean squared prediction error of the synthetic control with respect to S!*#:  






for some Z6 ⊆ {1,2, … , M)}.  
 
2.4.5 Specifications 
To benchmark the synthetic control estimates, I first estimate the impact of A8 
migration on wages using spatial correlations, in line with the existing literature, by 
way of benchmarking the synthetic control specifications described below. Data are 
first-differenced to allow for the estimation of the impact of quarterly changes in 
local labour market A8 stocks. ∆ log(R7*) = kl7∆m87* + [p7*l7]r + s7* is 
estimated using weighted least squares, where ∆ log(R7*) represents the change in 
mean hourly log wages in LLM ) between quarter N − 1 and quarter N,  ∆m87* is 
the change in LLM A8 stocks over the same time period, p7* is a vector of first-
differenced covariates, and l7 is an analytical weight for each LLM equal to the 
reciprocal of that respective LLM’s population (to account for the fact that absolute 
changes in A8 stocks are relative to differing LLM populations). k is thus an 
estimate of the marginal impact of A8 inflows on log wages, subject to the 
assumption that the conditional independence assumption holds (as is discussed 
above). Analysis is restricted to the treated and donor control LLMs analysed in the 
synthetic control specifications so as to ensure the results in both relate to 
comparable samples. Results are reported in Table 2.5. 
 
I then estimate a simple difference in difference estimator between the pooled 
‘treated’ regions and the unweighted pool of donor control regions, controlling for 
covariates. log(R7*) = tu) + tu!N + tu")8 + tu/)8N + Wt + s7̂* is estimated by 
ordinary least squares, where log wages are on the left hand side, N is time specified 
continuously measured in quarters, )8 is a binary indicator variable equal to one if 
the local labour market is treated and the observation occurs in the post-treatment 
period and W is a (v	 × 	T) matrix of v observations and T covariates. )8N is 
therefore an interaction term where tu/ represents the difference in difference 
estimator of trend hourly wage growth between treated and pooled donor control 
regions in the post-treatment period. Results are reported in Table 2.6.  
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The synthetic control specification uses an ‘employment placebo’ as per Borjas 
(2017); I additionally control for various explanatories on wage as this is found to 
reduce root mean squared prediction error in the nested optimisation process, and 
therefore better match treated regions to synthetic donors on pre-treatment trends. 
The W matrix therefore contains continuous measures of unemployment rates, age 
and years of education (and their quadratics), and binary indicator variables for 
gender, race, marital status, disability status, and public sector employment; in the 
aggregated data these binary indicators summate to represent population shares. 
These variables were chosen by regressing log wages on various specifications, and 
choosing the specification with the highest adjusted R-Squared.  
 
For robustness I include two additional synthetic control specifications (results are 
presented in the appendix). Firstly, I include only the ‘employment placebo’, 
dropping all other predictor variables; in this specification the w7* matrix controls 
only for local labour market pre-treatment employment rates. Treated local labour 
markets are therefore matched to donor controls on general macro-labour market 
conditions using a wage curve relationship (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1994).  
 
As a second robustness check, employment rates are removed from the 
specification, as there is clearly potential for reverse causality due to the ‘wage 
curve’ relationship between employment and wages proposed by Blanchflower & 
Oswald (1994). Nonetheless it is important to control for employment in some way, 
as standard theory dictates that migrants should rationally select into local labour 
markets where their probability of employment is maximised. The pool of donor 
control LLMs for each treated region is therefore restricted to those with mean pre-
treatment sample unemployment rates that are not statistically different from the 
respective treated LLM at the 95% level.  
 
In each specification the impact on log hourly wages is estimated for the full 
population as well as the two groups with whom A8s primarily compete: under 30s 
and low-skilled workers. As discussed in the Data section, it is not possible to 
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directly compare on educational attainment due to the way the LFS codes some 
foreign qualifications. I therefore restrict the low-skilled sample to those who left 
the education system below age 20. This is for two reasons: firstly because whilst 
A8s are more likely to select into low-skilled work, their education level does not 
appear to be different from existing migrants, so it would seem erroneous to impose 
that they compete with those who left school at 16; secondly, a cut-off closer to 16 
would restrict the sample to a point where donor group sample sizes are too small 
to draw meaningful analysis.  
 
Once the synthetic control regions are generated, deviations in post-treatment 
trends between treatment and control are identified using difference in differences. 
log	(R7*) = tu) + tu!N + tu")8 + tu/)8N + s7̂* is estimated by OLS, where log 
wages are on the left hand side, N is time specified continuously measured in 
quarters, )8 is a binary indicator variable equal to one if the local labour market is 
treated and the observation occurs in the post-treatment period; )8N is therefore an 
interaction term where tu/ represents the difference in difference estimator of trend 
hourly wage growth between treated and synthetic control regions in the post-




 All Workers Low Education 21-30s 
Dep. Var.: ∆ log(R7*) 
k -0.0000125 -0.0000008 -0.0000369* 
t-Stat -1.57 -0.73 -1.65 
Spatial Cells (N) 266 266 266 
Adj R-sq 0.0640 0.0441 0.0610 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
Table 2.5: results from spatial correlations specification (data aggregated to LLM level). Coefficient is 





Difference in Differences  
 
 All Workers Low Education 21-30s 
Dep. Var.: log	(R7*) 
tu/ 0.00194 0.00151 0.00000 
t-Stat 0.00882 0.00820 0.01054 
Spatial Cells (N) 42 42 42 
Adj R-sq 0.9321 0.6363 0.9407 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
Table 2.6: results from difference-in-differences specification (data aggregated to LLM level). Coefficient is 
interpretable as the log point change in expected wages in ‘treated’ regions compared to comparable regions 
that did not experience a significant increase in A8 stocks.   
 
Consistent with the literature, the spatial correlation specification (see Table 2.5) 
estimates no statistically significant marginal impact of A8 migration on log hourly 
wages for the sample of all workers and those with lower education levels; a very 
small (0.000037 log point) negative marginal impact is identified for 21-30s, (just) 
significant (at 10% level). 
 
Difference in difference results are presented in Table 2.6, and Figure 2.5. The 
unweighted difference in difference estimator similarly identifies no statistically 
significant impact for all workers, nor for 21-30s or the less educated, and the 
coefficients are very close to zero. It is important to note that the interpretation of 
the coefficients (including those in the synthetic control regressions) is slightly 
different to those of spatial correlation; the SCM regressions estimate the change in 
trend LLM wage growth post-accession comparative to the synthetic 
counterfactual, as opposed to the marginal unit impact. As such their polarity can 



































2001q2 2002q3 2003q4 2005q1 2006q2
Year, Quarter
Treated LLMs Control
Difference in Differences; Pooled Treated and Control LLMs - All Observations
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Local Labour Market A B C D Pooled 
tu/ 0.00431*** 0.00205 0.00361*** 0.00112 .00194** 
t-stat 3.20372 1.34509 3.26930 1.27382 2.19570 
RMSPE 0.08179 0.04975 0.09680 0.05104 0.05991 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 0 0 0 0.19 0.087 
2 0 0 0 0 0.028 
3 0.253 0 0.456 0.049 0.164 
4 0.105 0.051 0 0 0 
5 0.415 0 0.284 0.025 0.043 
6 0.079 0.574 0.225 0.36 0.389 
7 0.038 0.05 0 0 0 
8 0.009 0.324 0 0.097 0.134 
9 0.022 0 0.036 0.278 0.156 
10 0.079 0 0 0 0 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
Table 2.7: Synthetic control results for all workers, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all treated LLMs 
pooled. Coefficient interpretable as the log point change in expected wages in the respective ‘treated’ region(s) 
compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. Treated LLMs A-D, and donor control LLMs 1-10, are 







Figure 2.6 Figure 2.7 






Local Labour Market a b c d Pooled 
!"! 0.00039 0.00113 0.00169 -0.00042 0.00049 
t-stat 0.25680 0.71652 1.58704 -0.40306 0.63475 
RMSPE 0.07468 0.06065 0.06133 0.05047 0.03675 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 0.49 0 0.2 0.333 0.203 
2 0 0 0.234 0 0.106 
3 0 0 0.044 0 0 
4 0 0.048 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0.524 0 0.135 0.186 
7 0 0.021 0 0 0 
8 0.498 0.407 0.487 0.346 0.419 
9 0.012 0 0.036 0.186 0.086 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
Table 2.8: Synthetic control  results for workers with low levels of education, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all treated LLMs pooled. Coefficient interpretable as the log point 
change in expected wages in the respective ‘treated’ region(s) compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. Treated LLMs A-D, and donor control LLMs 1-10, are defined 
in Appendix B.  





Figure 2.10 Figure 2.11 







Local Labour Market a b c d Pooled 
!"! 0.001183 -0.00349 -0.00029 -0.0003 -0.00114 
t-stat 0.465353 -1.04993 -0.15066 -0.18393 -0.68738 
RMSPE 0.12680 0.12022 0.15244 0.08592 0.09988 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0.456 0 0.342 0.186 0.234 
4 0.285 0.136 0.051 0.13 0.143 
5 0.108 0 0.217 0.068 0.076 
6 0 0.795 0.39 0.273 0.365 
7 0.061 0 0 0 0 
8 0.09 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0.069 0 0.343 0.182 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
Table 2.9: Synthetic control  results for under-30s, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all treated LLMs pooled. Coefficient interpretable as the log point change in expected wages 
in the respective ‘treated’ region(s) compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. Treated LLMs A-D, and donor control LLMs 1-10, are defined in Appendix B.  






Figure 2.14 Figure 2.15 




Synthetic Control results for employment placebo with controls are presented for 
All Workers in Table 2.7, and Figures 2.6-2.9. I find small positive wage growth 
impacts of between 0.36 and 0.43 percentage points, significant to the 1% level in 
two of the treated LLMs, and a positive growth impact of 0.19 percentage points at 
the 5% level in the pooled sample. Two treated LLMs, ‘b’ and ‘d’ yield positive 
growth estimates of 0.21 percentage points and 0.11 percentage points respectively, 
but are not statistically significant. Estimators in the low education sample (see 
Table 2.8; Figures 2.8-2.13) remain small and (mostly) positive, between 0.04 and 
0.16 percentage points though none are found to be significant. No significant 
impact was identified for 21-30s (Table 2.9; Figures 2.14-2.17), though coefficients 
are negative in LLMs ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’ and the pooled sample.   
 
Results for the employment placebo without controls are presented in the Appendix 
A, Small positive but statistically significant wage impact for all workers (Table 
2.11; Figures 2.18-2.21) in three out of the four ‘treated’ LLMs and the pooled 
sample, of between 0.17 and 0.31 percentage points. The employment placebo also 
identified a small but significant positive impact in two of the four treated LLMs in 
the low education sample and the pooled low education sample (Table 2.12; Figures 
2.22-2.25), of between 0.14 and 0.25 percentage points. No statistically significant 
impact was identified for 21-30s (Table 2.13; Figures 2.26-2.29), though similarly 
to the spatial estimates the coefficients were small and negative in all but one LLMs 
and the pooled sample. 
 
Results for the final SCM setup with donor LLMs matched to treated LLMs 
manually are presented in Appendix A. For the sample of all workers (Table 2.14; 
Figures 2.30-2.33), small and positive estimators of between 0.05 and 0.35 
percentage points are identified, and are significant in two out of the four treated 
LLMs (at 1% and 5% levels respectively). The estimators on the low education 
sample (Table 2.15; Figures 2.34-2.37) remain positive, but are not significant; the 
estimated effect on 21-30s (Table 2.16; Figures 2.38-2.41) is close to zero in all 
four LLMs and none are significant.  
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The SCM estimates across all specifications are consistent with the literature, in 
that for the most part the null hypothesis of zero effect cannot be rejected, and where 
significant effects are identified they are very close to zero. Analogously to the 
spatial correlation estimates, the worst performing of the subpopulations studied in 
terms of post-accession wages is 21-30s, although the negative coefficients are not 
found to be significant. For the less educated subsample small positive coefficients 
are identified, comparative to no effect using spatial correlation, though these 
estimators switch from significance at the 1% or 5% level in the employment 
placebo to being insignificant when covariates are added in the matching process; 
this warrants some discussion.  
 
A clear explanation is that where treated LLMs are matched to donor controls on 
LLM employment rates, !!, alone, " simply becomes an identity matrix, and so 
minimising root mean square predictor error ‖$" − $#&‖$ simply becomes 
‖'" − '#&‖%!. In other words, instead of weighting donor control regions on 
similarity in terms of explanatory variables’ relative explanatory power, the process 
weights employment rates as if they explain wages in their entirety. Adding 
(relevant) covariates to the $& and $" matrices will therefore inevitably reduce 
weights in the & matrix assigned to donor LLMs which are similar to the treated 
LLM in terms of employment rates, but dissimilar to the treated region in terms of 
other relevant explanatory characteristics. This can be directly observed in the 
results tables and graphs: for the low education subsample RMSPE is uniformly 
lower in the employment placebo with controls comparative to the employment 
placebo, and the graphs show a notably better pre-treatment fit. 
 
This is not substantively dissimilar to the critique of Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) found by Smith & Todd’s (2005) replication of Dehejia & Wahba (1999). 
PSM is the statistical technique from which SCM was developed (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2003), in which pairs of treated and untreated observations are 
matched and weighted in terms of pre-treatment characteristics. Dehejia & Wahba 
applied various non-experimental econometric techniques (including PSM) to 
survey data, comparing their results to those from the fully randomised NSW 
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Demonstration, concluding that bias in PSM estimates is negligible. Smith & Todd 
(2005) find that PSM is extremely sensitive to the set of control variables on which 
the propensity score is defined, and that results inconsistent with those from the 
experimental data can be obtained by PSM using a different (but equally 
reasonable) set of variables in the propensity scores.  
 
However the results for the all-worker sample remain consistently positive, small 
and significant in all SCM specifications. This is supportive of the results of 
Manacorda, Manning, & Wadsworth (2012), who find evidence to suggest migrants 
and natives are gross compliments in the labour market, with a small positive wage 
effect of migration for natives. In Table 2.10, the employment placebo (without 
controls)5 specification is repeated with a sample restricted to white British males.  
 
Local Labour Market A B C D Pooled 
Whole Sample 
!"! 0.00313*** 0.00190 0.00204** 0.00169** 0.00180** 
 
t-stat 2.67 1.60 2.51 2.10 2.54 
RMSPE 0.09417 0.08044 0.11653 0.07915 0.05632 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 42 
White British Males 
!"! 0.00388*** 0.00531*** 0.00257** 0.00085 0.00216** 
t-stat 2.82 3.60 2.14 0.80 2.15 
 
RMSPE 0.077101 0.07528 0.15403 0.08937 0.13283 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 42 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
Table 2.10: Synthetic control results for white British males, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all treated 
LLMs pooled. Coefficient interpretable as the log point change in expected wages in the respective ‘treated’ 
region(s) compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. Treated LLMs A-D, and donor control LLMs 1-




5 The specification without controls is chosen for comparison purposes as race 
and gender dummies are used as control variables. 
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With the exception of LLM ‘d’, for which the coefficient is very small and not 
significant, a more positive and significant wage effect is identified for white 
British males than the sample as a whole. Heterogeneity in treatment effects 
according to demography could therefore be driving the positive results in the all-
worker sample, given no significant wage effect was identified for the groups A8s 
are thought to primarily compete with in the labour force. It should, however, be 
stressed that this is only an indicative result: ideally the process would be repeated 
for non-natives, but the small sample size is prohibitive. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
In keeping with the findings in the spatial study by Lemos & Portes (2008), I find 
no evidence of a short run effect of A8 migration on hourly earnings for the groups 
A8s are believed to primarily compete with in the labour force. Further, I find a 
very small but statistically significant positive wage impact for the overall labour 
force in affected local labour markets, which is particularly strong for white British 
males; this finding is supportive of existing evidence from Manacorda, Manning, 
& Wadsworth (2012), which suggests migrants and natives are gross compliments 
in the labour force.  
 
Three specifications have been used to construct synthetic placebo labour markets: 
firstly using an ‘employment placebo’ as per Borjas (2017), then adding control 
variables to the employment specification, and finally controlling only for these 
variables whilst restricting the sample to donor local labour markets with similar 
pre-accession unemployment rates. The makeup of the synthetic placebo, and the 
statistical significance of results, seems to be strongly dependent on the control 
variables specified by the researcher; this finding is similar to existing critiques of 
related Propensity Score Matching techniques.  
 
In the context of a migration shock as nationally widespread as the A8s, synthetic 
control has obvious drawbacks in capturing the overall wage effect of migration in 
that it compares regions with a clear and significant influx to those with none; as 
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such, it might be expected to deliver slightly larger treatment effect estimates than 
are externally valid to the country overall. Spatial correlation remains a suitable 
tool to assess the effects of such geographically diffused immigration, however the 
employment of synthetic control as a robustness check to spatial estimates seems a 




























2.7 Appendix A 
 




Local Labour Market A B C D Pooled 
!"! 0.00313*** 0.00190 0.00204** 0.00169** 0.00180** 
 
t-stat 2.66638 1.59512 2.50614 2.09838 2.53696 
RMSPE 0.09417 0.08044 0.11653 0.07915 0.05632 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 0.127 0.097 0.127 0.091 0.105 
2 0.208 0.097 0.22 0.09 0.106 
3 0.126 0.097 0.125 0.091 0.105 
4 0.101 0.098 0.099 0.093 0.103 
5 0.107 0.097 0.106 0.092 0.104 
6 0.081 0.099 0.08 0.098 0.1 
7 0.034 0.112 0.032 0.137 0.086 
8 0.085 0.099 0.083 0.096 0.1 
9 0.054 0.104 0.052 0.111 0.093 
10 0.076 0.1 0.074 0.099 0.098 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
 
 
Table 2.11: Synthetic Control (Employment Placebo) results for all workers, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all 
treated LLMs pooled. Coefficient interpretable as the log point change in expected wages in the respective ‘treated’ 
region(s) compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. Treated LLMs A-D, and donor control LLMs 1-10, are 















Low Education  
 
Local Labour Market a b c d Pooled 
Figure 2.18 Figure 2.19 
Figure 2.20 Figure 2.21 
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!"! 0.00232** 0.00139 0.00249*** 0.00101 0.00138** 
 
t-stat 2.37624 1.17985 3.68509 1.32999 2.03426 
RMSPE 0.11658 0.09752 0.10836 0.05851 0.04862 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 0.119 0.107 0.132 0.098 0.112 
2 0.111 0.105 0.108 0.098 0.108 
3 0.136 0.11 0.251 0.098 0.119 
4 0.104 0.103 0.094 0.099 0.104 
5 0.1 0.101 0.087 0.099 0.101 
6 0.1 0.101 0.086 0.099 0.101 
7 0.059 0.081 0.027 0.108 0.071 
8 0.1 0.101 0.087 0.099 0.101 
9 0.081 0.092 0.056 0.102 0.087 
10 0.091 0.097 0.071 0.1 0.095 















Figure 2.22 Figure 2.23 





Local Labour Market a b c d Pooled 
!"! -0.00088 -0.00181 -0.00017 0.00081 -0.00056 
 
t-stat -0.33260 -0.81511 -0.11155 0.58729 -0.43331 
RMSPE 0.18935 0.13761 0.15623 0.08689 0.07748 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 0.08 0.099 0.11 0.089 0.105 
2 0.116 0.098 0.135 0.085 0.111 
3 0.081 0.099 0.11 0.089 0.105 
4 0.492 0.098 0.212 0.082 0.116 
5 0.056 0.1 0.09 0.096 0.099 
6 0.05 0.1 0.084 0.099 0.098 
7 0.011 0.104 0.043 0.141 0.084 
8 0.045 0.1 0.079 0.101 0.096 
9 0.022 0.103 0.056 0.117 0.089 
10 0.048 0.1 0.082 0.1 0.097 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
 Table 2.13: Synthetic Control (Employment Placebo) results for under-30s, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all treated LLMs pooled. Coefficient interpretable as the log 
point change in expected wages in the respective ‘treated’ region(s) compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. Treated LLMs A-D, and donor control LLMs 1-10, are 






Figure 2.26 Figure 2.27 
Figure 2.28 Figure 2.29 
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Local Labour Market a b c d 
!"! 0.00342*** 0.00173 0.00277** 0.00048 
t-stat 2.99566 1.20875 2.21652 0.54225 
RMSPE 0.0444 0.04809 0.02640 0.03551 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 0 N/A N/A N/A 
2 0.108 N/A NA N/A 
3 0.336 N/A 0.147 N/A 
4 0 0.198 0 0.045 
5 0 N/A 0.35 N/A 
6 0.006 0.469 0.044 0.183 
7 0.001 N/A N/A N/A 
8 0 0.333 0.458 0.175 
9 0.345 N/A N/A N/A 
10 0.204 0 N/A 0.597 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
Table 2.14: Synthetic Control (matching on unemployment rates manually) results for all workers, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all treated LLMs pooled. Coefficient 
interpretable as the log point change in expected wages in the respective ‘treated’ region(s) compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. Treated LLMs A-D, and donor control 






Figure 2.30 Figure 2.31 





Local Labour Market a b c d 
!"! 0.00112 0.00123 0.00221* -0.00139 
t-stat 1.05064 0.80649 1.81456 -1.53441 
RMSPE 0.05056 0.03690 0.04146 0.09704 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 N/A N/A 0 N/A 
3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 0 0.13 0 N/A 
5 0.347 0 0.502 N/A 
6 0.02 0.595 0 N/A 
7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8 0.204 0.276 0.498 0.274 
9 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10 0.43 0 N/A 0.726 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
 Table 2.15: Synthetic Control (matching on unemployment rates manually) results for those with low education, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all treated LLMs 
pooled. Coefficient interpretable as the log point change in expected wages in the respective ‘treated’ region(s) compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. 








Figure 2.34 Figure 2.35 





Local Labour Market a b c d 
!"! 0.00132 -0.00283 0.00107 -0.00171 
t-stat 0.49531 -0.87399 0.58733 -1.07785 
RMSPE 0.07900 0.11851 0.07556 0.04820 
Spatial Cells 42 42 42 42 
Donor Labour Market Weights 
1 0 0 0 0.273 
2 0.059 N/A N/A N/A 
3 0.67 0.132 0.587 N/A 
4 0.021 N/A N/A N/A 
5 0.251 0.022 0.202 N/A 
6 N/A 0.744 N/A 0.234 
7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8 0 0 0.211 0.149 
9 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
131 N/A 0.102 N/A 0.344 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
Table 2.16: Synthetic Control (matching on unemployment rates manually) results for under 30s, for treated LLMs a, b, c, and d, and all treated LLMs pooled. Coefficient 
interpretable as the log point change in expected wages in the respective ‘treated’ region(s) compared to that region’s synthetic counterfactual. Treated LLMs A-D, and 
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15,349 44,489 61,841 84,606 
Unemployment 
Rate (at time of 
policy) 
5.37% 4.91% 3.88% 5.29% 
Average Hourly 
Wage (at time 
of policy) 
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Donor Control LLMs 
 




































4,131 7,054 11,395 4,382 4,451 9,631 4,486 4,822 11,831 10,551 
Unemployment 
Rate (at time 
of policy) 
2.37% 4.56% 4.51% 3.2% 3.5% 5.81% 16.22% 3.66% 7.45% 5.13% 
Average 
Hourly Wage 
(at time of 
policy) 
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3. Impact of PAYG Ticketing on 
Rail Passenger Demand in London, 
and Wider Economic Impacts 
 





*School of Management, Royal Holloway, University of London 
**Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London  
  




In this paper, we use the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) to evaluate the impact 
of Pay As You Go (PAYG) rail ticketing on rail passenger demand, as well as 
evaluating the secondary impacts on house prices, unemployment, and pollution in 
the locality of affected stations. We contribute to the literature by providing what 
we believe to be the on comparative case study of the impacts of PAYG ticketing 
in London, with what we believe to be the first application of SCM in the rail 
transport literature.  
 
Oyster is a Pay-As-You-Go rail ticketing system, valid in the London Travel Zone 
(LTZ) on buses, trains, the London Underground, trams, and river boats; passengers 
travelling to or from stations outside of the LTZ must use traditional paper tickets. 
For passengers who travel to or from stations that are affected by LTZ extensions 
there are two potential driving factors for a change in travel behaviour: price, and 
convenience. We utilise SCM to conduct a comparative case study to identify the 
net change in passenger flows at the station level resultant of five LTZ expansions 
between 2010 and 2015; we find changes in passenger behaviour are driven entirely 
by price, and find suggestive evidence that the additional journeys are made by 
commuters. Further, we investigate the wider economic impacts to the immediate 
area surrounding stations affected by LTZ expansions where a change to passenger 
behaviour is identified; we find no evidence of wider impacts on house prices, 
unemployment, traffic, nor pollution.  
 
Oyster was first introduced across the London transport network in 2004, as a 
contactless PAYG ticketing system. In its earliest form passengers pre-paid for 
travel by “topping up” the card at a convenient location, and accessed public 
transport by tapping their Oyster Card on an Oyster reader; at the end of each day 
and/or week, the system reconciles passengers’ journeys, capping charges at the 
lowest possible fare for that day or week’s travel (Day & Reed, 2010). In 2014 the 
system was simplified even further, allowing passengers to use their bank cards as 
an Oyster Card, with the appropriate daily/weekly cap being debited from that card 
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(Metro Report International, 2014). Initially, Oyster could only be used on the 
London Underground and buses; in 2010 it was rolled out onto National Rail 
services within the pre-existing London Travel Zone (Transport for London, 2011). 
Between 2010 and 2016, as part of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (Greater London 
Authority, 2010), the LTZ expanded to encapsulate various stations within the 
Greater London area and beyond into the Home Counties, allowing Oyster to be 
used at these stations for the first time; it is these extensions that are used for the 
purposes of analysis in this paper, as the fact that they were outside of the London 
Travel Zone altogether prior to expansion allows for the modelling of a clean 
counterfactual.  
 
There exists a copious literature on the price elasticity of demand for rail travel in 
the UK, which is thoroughly reviewed by Wardman (2014). Studies typically find 
different results for the long and short runs, reflecting that it takes time for price 
changes to affect commuting habits and travel preferences. Using elasticity 
estimates from 167 studies, Wardman (2014) shows UK demand for rail travel is 
consistently price elastic in the Long Run across studies, and inelastic in the Short 
Run (PED of -1.11 vs -0.69); this is supported by Canavan et al. (2018), who find 
similar results for 32 Metro systems worldwide.  Existing literature, however, posits 
a wide range of train fare elasticities.  Owen and Phillips (1987) report inelastic 
London based inter-city short-run demand of -0.69 and long-run elastic demand of 
-1.08.  Paulley et al. (2006)’s meta-analysis of 104 published and unpublished 
studies, providing 902 public transport fare elasticities, going back as far as 1951 
but focusing on the period 1980 – 2002 (building on Webster and Bly 1980), finds 
inelastic short-run suburban rail demand of -0.6.  Oxera (2005) finds inelastic short-
run demand of -0.69 for rail travel between London and the rest of the country and 
long-run elastic demand of -2.03.  For journeys in London and the South East, 
however, they report elastic demand for short-, medium- and long-run (1.47, -1.27 
and -1.48 respectively).  The studies summarised by Wardman (2014) suggest UK 
leisure travellers exert price elastic demand (PED of -1.05), whereas commuters 
exert price inelastic demand (PED of -0.82), and business passengers more inelastic 
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still (PED of -0.62); this is supported by recent evidence from Chile (De Grange et. 
al., 2013), and China (Wang et. al., 2018). LeighFisher (2016) in a report for 
Department for Transport find Short Run price elasticities for Short-Distance 
journeys to London, and Short-Distance journeys to other metropolitan areas in the 
UK, to be similarly inelastic, with a PED of -0.69 in both cases. Mackett (1985), 
using the Leeds Integrated Land-use Transport Model (Mackett 1983) and 
focussing only on commuters traveling from Hertfordshire, however, found fares 
to be inelastic to central London (-0.4) but highly elastic for those traveling to Inner 
London6 (-1.5) and marginally elastic for those traveling to neighbouring non-
London locations (-1.1). 
 
It is notable that much of the literature in this field is or refers to ageing material.  
Glaister (1983), Goodwin (1992) and Oum et al. (1992) are particularly well cited 
with many other venerable sources being cited as well.  Button (2019) points out 
that rising incomes and changes in consumer taste may cause demand elasticities to 
change over time due to shifts in the demand function.  Balcombe et al. (2004: 16) 
and Paulley et al. (2006: 297) also argue that fare elasticities can change over time 
and report that between the seminal Transport and Road Research Laboratory study 
undertaken in 1980 (Webster & Bly 1981) and 2004/06 short-run suburban rail fare 
elasticity increased from -0.5 to -0.58/-0.6.  Short-run London bus fare elasticity, 
however, was fairly stable (-0.44 in 1980 and -0.43 on aggregate in 2006 (Paulley 
2006).  Short-run bus fare elasticity overall, however, rose from -0.30 in the 1980 
study to -0.42 reported in Paulley (2006) and aggregate short-run UK metro fare 
elasticity doubled from -0.15 reported in Webster and Bly (1980) to -0.30 (see Table 
3.1).  In all cases, however, the range of reported values was wide suggesting a need 
for caution and careful interpretation. 
 
Whilst the sheer range of recorded elasticities is difficult in itself, it is, as Hensher 
(2008), Oum et al (1992) point out (p.139), made still more challenging by the lack 
 
6 Inner London consists of the boroughs bordering Central London, as defined in 
the Local Government Act 1963 
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of consistent usage of the short- and long-run term.  Owen and Phillips define the 
short-run as four weeks (p.242), and the long-run as within six months of a change 
(p.251).  Oxera (2005) is consistent in using four weeks as the short-run period for 
all fare changes, but quote a nearly five years for long-run elasticity outside of 
London and the South East but only one year to reach 90% of the long term figure 
in London, Bresson et al. (2003) is vague in the timing of short- vs long-run 
(although short-run is longer than 1 month – p609).  Paulley et al. (2006), on the 
other hand, assume the short-run to be between one and two years, medium run to 
be 5-7 years and the long-run to be twelve to fifteen years (and, possibly, as long as 
twenty).  De Grange et al. (2013) defines short-run as under two years, medium-run 
as 2-5 years and long-run as anything over five years.  Canavan et al. (2018) merely 
refers to short- and long-run without defining periods for either. Glaister (1983) 
does not engage with consideration of differences between short- and long-term 
elasticities.  The lack of clarity and consistency over short- and long-run time 
frames is problematic in an industry sector in which franchises were, typically, and 
may still, be awarded for seven or eight years at a time (Preston 2016: 111; 2018: 
187). 
 












Short-run UK bus fare elasticity -0.42 -0.07 -0.86 -0.30 33 
Short-run UK metro fare elasticity  -0.30 -0.15 -0.55 -0.15 15 
Short-run UK Suburban rail fare 
elasticity 
-0.58 -0.10 -1.02 -0.50 20 
Short-run UK London bus fare 
elasticity 
-0.43 0.14 -0.84 -0.44 15 
Table 3.1. Comparison of fare elasticities between Paulley et. al. (2006), and the 1980 Black Book. Taken 
from Table 1 in Paulley et. al. (2006) 
 
In terms of the impact of PAYG pricing on demand, the evidence is less clear. 
McCollom & Pratt (2004) find that PAYG ticketing appeals primarily to infrequent 
travellers; Graham & Mulley (2012) find PAYG is favoured by more wealthy 
passengers, whereas Cervero (1990) find it to be favoured by younger passengers.  




Previous LTZ expansions have often been followed by claims from estate agents 
that there has been a resultant rise in demand for local housing stock, positively 
impacting prices (e.g. Evening Standard (2015), Savills (2017)), however serious 
authoritative evidence on the impact of Oyster, PAYG ticketing, or rail pricing in 
general, on house prices is surprisingly sparse. A literature does exist on the impact 
of new railway lines, which are typically found to increase property prices near 
those new lines, e.g. SuperTram in South Yorkshire (Henneberry, 1998), the Jubilee 
Line extension and Docklands Light Railway (Gibbons & Machin 2005), and 
Crossrail (Comber & Arribas-Bel, 2017). The magnitude of effects identified varies 
substantially between studies, and a minority of studies have reported a negative 
effect (e.g. Forrest et. al. 1996). Similar results can be found elsewhere in the world 
(see Debrezion, Pels & Rietveld (2007) for a review). 
 
Similarly, the literature on the impact of rail on the labour market focusses largely 
on infrastructure investment as opposed to pricing. Combes et. al. (2008) notes that 
as new rail infrastructure is built, labour supply typically increases in affected areas 
at both intensive and extensive margins. Berechman & Paaswell (1983) analyse the 
wider economic impacts of the introduction of a light railway in Buffalo, New York, 
finding that there was a significant increase in retail employment in the local area 
after the introduction of the railway; in a follow-up study (Berechman & Paaswell, 
2005) the authors note that this rise in employment was contingent on private sector 
investment occurring after the public funding for the railway was secured. In a case 
study on London’s Crossrail project, Banister & Thurstain-Goodwin (2011) find 
that in addition to increasing labour force participation, the widening of the 
geographical labour market area will increase competition between firms, leading 
to innovation, in turn increasing labour productivity. The same study analyses the 
1998 Jubilee Line extension, finding that employment near the new stations 
increased by 17% between 1998 and 2000, comparative to an 8% increase in 
Greater London more generally.  
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There does, however, exist a literature that explores the Economics of Commuting, 
which explains demand for rail travel in terms of the labour supply decision. 
Guglieminetti et al. (2017) found that unemployed workers will, initially, look for 
well-paid work within their locality with reservation wages increasing with 
commuting time. As periods of unemployment rise and remaining period on 
unemployment benefits (prior to unemployment assistance) dwindles job seekers 
will accept longer commutes and/or lower wages. Guglielminetti et al. (2017) also 
posit that in the case that unemployment benefits (from unemployment insurance) 
give way to less generous unemployment assistance in long term unemployment 
length of acceptable commute declines again as relative cost of job search increase.  
Nielsen and Hargesen (2008), using data from the 1991 and 2001 census and GIS 
mapping of commuter flows, show that the majority of commuting flow occurs 
within the corridor connecting London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds with 
concentration of commuter activity increasing with proximity to each of these 
metropolitan areas.  Over time, however, Nielsen and Hargesen (2008) identify an 
increase in the width of the commuter corridor as greater numbers of workers 
choose to live in rural areas whilst taking employment based in urban areas.  
 
Environmental impacts of rail pricing clearly depend on the impact of rail price 
changes on car usage. According to Paulley et. al. (2006) car usage and rail pricing 
are only weakly related in urban areas in the UK, with an estimated cross elasticity 
of 0.054. The study also estimates the cross elasticity between car cost and rail 
usage, finding it to be higher (0.59) for urban areas, and smaller (0.25) for 
interurban areas. Leape (2006) finds the introduction of congestion charging in 
London reduced the number of cars in the city by 34%. Transport for London 
estimated that about half of the fewer trips were diverted to some form of public 
transport, mostly buses. Effects on trains seem to be small and difficult to identify 
(Leape, 2006). This suggests that rail fare changes have little to no effect on 
people’s choice to use the car. 
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We contribute to this literature by presenting evidence on the impact of PAYG 
ticketing on demand for rail travel over a 3-6 year period, and the wider economic 
and environmental impacts where changes in demand are identified. We do not find 
any evidence that PAYG ticketing alone has an effect on demand, however we do 
find that there is a significant positive impact on demand where the change to fare 
structure results in lower fares for peak-time commuters. We do not find evidence 
that the expansion of Oyster has any effect on house prices, unemployment, traffic, 
nor pollution in the locality of the affected stations.  
3.2 Data 
Firstly, due to the differing spatial units reported in the various datasets used in our 
analysis, we utilise the ONS Postcode Directory (Office for National Statistics, 
2018) to ensure stations are mapped to the correct CAS Ward, according to their 
postcode. 1	km! MAAQ spatial units are mapped to CAS Wards according to their 
centroid coordinates, and stations are mapped to their corresponding LSOA 
according to their full postcode. We also use these data to establish the geographical 
coordinates of stations, using which we calculate their distance from traffic count 
measures in the AADF data.  
 
As a measure of passenger flows we utilise The Office for Rail and Road’s Station 
Usage data (Office for Rail and Road, 2018), from 1997 to 2018; total annual 
passenger entries and exits are reported at the station level. Data in this series are 
predominantly sourced from ticket sales datasets LENNON and the revenue 
allocation mechanism MOIRA2, and are corrected with modelled estimates of 
journeys for which origin and/or destination are not recorded in ticket sales data 
(e.g. zonal products such as travelcards, and tickets sold at newsagents or by Train 
Operating Companies (TOCs) not covered by the Rail Settlement Plan) (Steer 
Davies Gleave, 2017). Due to various different firms being tendered to compile the 
annualised data over the history of the series, variables reported are not entirely 
consistent over time (e.g. some years include data on numbers of concessionary 
tickets, and sometimes types of concession, whereas other years not); however a 
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measure of total annual entries and exits is consistently either reported or can be 
derived for all years apart from the 2003/04 financial year. We use these data to 
construct a panel dataset of annual passenger numbers at the station level. In most 
years there are very minor changes to estimation procedures, however these 
differences are marked for the 2006/07 financial year, and to a lesser extent 2007/08 
and 2008/09 financial years, as various previously unobserved tickets, such as 
London Travelcards, were incorporated into the count through MOIRA2; this 
significantly affects observed passenger trends for many stations, particularly those 
in and around London. The 2006-09 changes do restrict the number of usable pre-
treatment periods in our passenger demand analysis, particularly for the 2009/10 
LTZ expansion to Grays, Ockendon and Purfleet, as it was immediately preceded 
by the changes in measurement. In all cases except the Zone A expansion, we 
therefore restrict the pre-treatment period in our analysis to the three years prior to 
the respective expansion, to exclude these inconsistent counts; for the Zone A 
expansion we restrict the pre-treatment period to the 2006/07 financial year 
onwards, as the change was most marked in 2006/07. In 2009/10 Oyster Pay as You 
Go (PAYG) fares were included for the first time, to coincide with the roll-out of 
Oyster PAYG onto the new London Overground (Steer Davies Gleave, 2017); this 
is unproblematic for our analysis.  
 
Pollution is measured using Defra’s Modelling of Ambient Air Quality (MAAQ), 
2000-2018 data (Department for Environment and Rural Affairs, 2018). MAAQ 
utilises data from monitoring sites around the UK and local area characteristics to 
model specific pollutants at 1	km! concentration maps. Data validity is ensured by 
comparing modelled pollutants to primary data from measuring sites not included 
in the calibration process (Ricardo Energy & Environment, 2017). Aggregating 
1	km! areas to CAS Ward level for comparability with spatial units in the other 
data in this study, we utilise annualised measures of Nitrogen Dioxide, Nitrogen 
Oxide, as well as PM"# and PM!.% measures of particulate matter, to capture 
changes in pollutants commonly associated with vehicle usage, in line with the 
current literature. 




Traffic flows are measured using The Department for Transport’s Average Annual 
Daily Flows (AADF) data (both minor and major roads), from 2000 to 2018 
(Department for Transport, 2018). Mean daily traffic at 31,844 locations across the 
UK are reported, with cars, light goods vehicles (LGVs), heavy goods vehicles 
(HGVs) and buses reported separately. Counts are estimated using a combination 
of manual counts, Automatic Traffic Counters (ATCs), and Automatic Number 
Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras. In addition to the road name, the road type, 
longitude and latitude are also reported.  
 
We utilise NOMIS claimant count panel data from 2004-2014 at the CAS Ward 
level (NOMIS, 2014) as a measure of unemployment. This is the most 
disaggregated measure of unemployment available in the UK; this is of particular 
importance to our identification strategy, given the large number of stations: if 
multiple stations exist within the same spatial unit, identification the effect of a 
change affecting only one of those stations is problematic. Data are reported 
monthly, however we aggregate to financial years such that data can be merged 
with ORR passenger data.  
 
To measure house prices we use Land Registry cross sectional Price Paid data (HM 
Land Registry, 2018), which records quarterly residential property sales, and sale 
prices, for flats, terraced houses, semi-detached houses and detached houses at the 
postcode sector7 level. We merge data across time to generate a panel dataset, and 
pool by financial year for compatibility with ORR data. Postcode sector does not 
perfectly predict CAS ward, so house price analysis is based on the postcode sector 
of the station. 
 
 
7 The UK is split into 9,550 postcode sectors. There are up to 390 postcodes per 
sector, and up to 80 households per postcode. Precise sizes of postcode sectors 
therefore varies; information on the number of households per sector are 
contained in Royal Mail PAF data, which are not freely available.  
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To facilitate the Synthetic Control approach, we utilise Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD) (2010) data (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government, 2015) to compare stations with similar local demographics. IMD data 
are available for 2007, 2010, and 2015; because the Oyster extensions analysed all 
occurred between 2010 and 2015, we utilise the 2010 measure in all analysis for 
direct comparability. The index is derived from a weighted combination of 
measures of income deprivation, employment deprivation, health deprivation, 
disability, human capital, barriers to housing and services, crime, and living 
environment deprivation, with weights allocated to each measure as determined by 
Dibben, et al. (2007) (Dibben, McLennan, Barnes, Noble, Davies, & Garratt, 2011). 
IMD data are disaggregated to the Lower layer Super Output Area (LSOA) level, 
which does not perfectly CAS Ward. This is unproblematic as we utilise IMD data 
as a matching variable, so we assign IMD indices to stations according to the LSOA 
in which the station resides.  
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
3.3.1. Passenger Numbers 
Table 3.2 details the stations that have been subject to Oyster extensions, the dates 
of those extensions, and the zone to which each station was allocated. Absent from 
this table is the 2016 Gatwick extension, which we exclude for two reasons: (a) 
Oyster remains more expensive than a paper ticket for some journeys (Oyster-Rail, 
2019), and (b) Gatwick Airport itself was subject to significant infrastructure 
investment at a similar point in time to the Oyster extension (Gatwick Airport, 
2018), which is likely to have impacted passenger numbers, thus impeding clean 
identification.  
 
Figure 3.3.3 shows passenger numbers (total annual entries and exits) for stations 
that were subject to Oyster expansions and allocated into Zones 7-C respectively. 
In terms of trends, passenger numbers in the Zone 7 stations appear to follow a 
moderately positive trend prior to the extension, with much higher growth post-
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extension. For Zone 8, it is not clear visually that there is any deviation in trend for 
Cheshunt; there does, however, appear to be a significant positive deviation in 
passenger trends for Dartford. In terms of Zone A, the trend for Grays is (aside from 
the first data point) linear and slightly negative prior to the extension, linear and 
positive for the first four years post-extension, and then concave and positive 
thereafter; trends for Ockendon and Purfleet are linear and slightly positive, and 
there is no obvious deviation from trend around the point of the extension. The Zone 
B stations exhibit positive linear trends, with no clear deviation at the point of the 
extension; this is similarly true of the only Zone C extension, Shenfield. 
 
Station Name Financial Year of Oyster 
Extension Zone 
Waltham Cross 2012/13 7 Theobalds Grove 2012/13 
Cheshunt 2012/13 8 Dartford 2015/16 
Grays 2009/10 






Hertford East 2015/16 
Rye House 2015/16 
St. Margaret’s 
(Hertfordshire) 2015/16 
Shenfield 2012/13 C 
Table 3.2. Rail stations subject Oyster zone extensions.  
 
 




Figure 3.3. Number of passengers in stations subject to Oyster extensions. The vertical dashed line indicates 
the time the extension was implemented. The extensions of zones 8 and B were implemented in different years 
for the different stations. The Lead/Lag indicates the years after/prior to the extensions and a lead of 1 is the 
first year after the extension. 
From the graphs, it therefore seems most likely that a positive impact on passenger 
numbers would be identified for Zones 7 and 8, which is what our counterfactual 
analysis will go on to demonstrate. Counterfactual analysis is necessary establish 
(a) whether deviations from trend are attributable to the extension of Oyster, and 
(b) that where no deviation from trend is observed, this would have been the case 
in the absence of the extension. 
 
3.3.2. House Prices 
Figure 3.4 shows the evolution in mean house price trends at the postcode sector 
level been 1997 and 2018 for stations encapsulated by Zones 7-C extensions 
respectively. Data represent house prices in the postcode sector of the respective 
station. Prior to extensions, house prices in all postcode sectors follow an upward, 









2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Year









-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Lead/Lag









2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year








2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Year










2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Year







2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Year
















      
86 
 
financial crash. For Zones 7 and 8, both of which occurred in 2012/13, there does 
appear to be an increase in house price growth in the period immediately after the 
Oyster extensions, however in each case this could be equally attributed to post-
crisis recovery, as broadly prices seem to be returning to their pre-crisis trend. The 
Zone An extension, occurring in 2009/10, happened too close to the financial crisis 
to draw meaningful conclusions graphically: there was a sharp increase in house 
prices immediately after the extension, but much of this growth is likely to be 
attributable to the macroeconomic recovery. In Zones B and C there is very little 
deviation from trend; Broxbourne in Zone B does exhibit a spike in house prices 
immediately prior to, and after, the Oyster extension, however house prices return 
to trend in 2017/18, suggestive that this is anomalous.  
 
Particularly given the temporal proximity of the various Oyster extensions to the 
financial crisis, the counterfactual analysis we present in the Methodology and 
Results section of this paper is of particular importance to net out any post-
expansion changes to house prices that are not attributable to Oyster. 
 




Figure 3.4. Average house price at the post code of the stations subject to Oyster extensions. The vertical 
dashed line indicates the time the extension was implemented. The extensions of zones 8 and B were 
implemented in different years for the different stations. The Lead/Lag indicates the years after/prior to the 
extensions and a lead of 1 is the first year after the extension. 
 
3.3.3. Unemployment 
Figure 3.5 shows Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) claimant count trends at the CAS 
Ward level between 2004 and 2014 for stations affected by Oyster expansions. Note 
that Dartford and all but one Zone B stations are excluded from this figure because 
these expansions occurred after this series ceased to be published by NOMIS. For 
all extensions observed, the claimant count was largely flat prior to the 2008 
financial crisis. After 2008, claimants increased sharply, peaking between 2009 and 
2011, before gradually decreasing. In Zones 7, 8 (Cheshunt), Zone 9 (Ockendon 
and Grays) and Zone C, the claimant count is observed to be monotonically 
decreasing post-expansion. In Zone A, the claimant count was increasing for three 
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Figure 3.5. Jobseeker’s allowance claimant count as percentage of the working population at the CAS ward 
level of the stations subject to Oyster extensions. The vertical dashed line indicates the time the extension was 
implemented. 
 
Similarly to the house price data presented above, it is difficult to draw meaningful 
conclusions from these data alone, because of the temporal proximity of the various 
extensions to the financial crisis. This challenge is augmented when analysing 
unemployment: labour markets do not adjust immediately to output shocks due to 
the prevalence of employment contracts (Bachmann et. al., 2015), and there is 
observed persistence of impacts on some segments of the UK labour market 
following the financial crisis (Bell & Blanchflower, 2010), (Bell & Blanchflower, 
2011), (Coulter, 2016), (Singleton, 2018).  
 
All stations exhibit a sharp decrease in their respective CAS Ward claimant count 
between 2013 and 2014. It should be noted that whilst some portion of this decrease 
is likely attributable to macroeconomic recovery, it coincides with the introduction 
of the introduction of the Jobseekers Act 2013, which imposes sanctions on job 
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ultimately resulted in temporary or permanent removal of JSA entitlement for 
around 11% of claimants in 2013/14 (Oakley, 2014). The close proximity of this 
national policy change to the 2012/13 Oyster expansions further precludes 
meaningful analysis of the raw trends.  
 
Because both of these phenomenon occurred nationally, the counterfactual analysis 
we present in the latter sections of this paper allows us to cleanly identify effects 
on the claimant count measure of unemployment attributable to Oyster expansion; 
using this methodology we do not find any evidence of an effect of Oyster 
expansion on local unemployment.  
 
3.3.4. Pollution 
Consistent with the current literature, we assess air quality using measurements of 
Nitrogen Dioxide, Nitrogen Oxide, PM"#, and PM!.% at the CAS Ward level 
between 2001 and 2017 for stations affected by Zone 7 – Zone C extensions 
respectively. In most cases there is a notable decrease in both Nitrogen Dioxide and 
Nitrogen Oxide between 2001 and 2004, followed by a steady downward linear 
trend, with no obvious deviation around the point of the respective Oyster 
extension. Both measures of particulate matter, PM"#, and PM!.%, exhibit notable 
increases between 2002 and 2004; between 2004 and 2010 there is a downward 
linear trend, preceding an increase in 2011 in all zones. Between 2011 and 2017 all 
zones exhibit a downward linear trend in particulate matter, save for a notable 
downward deviation in 2015. Once again, there is no obvious deviation attributable 
to the policy.  
 
In the analysis section of this paper we carry out counterfactual analysis on 
pollution trends, and find no evidence of a change in pollution levels attributable to 
Oyster expansion. We seek to explain these results by analysing traffic flows near 
the most affected stations, and find some suggestive evidence of a temporary 
increase in flows of cars attributable to the policy. 
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3.4 Identification Strategy 
Using the data available, deriving a before/after estimator by OLS in respect to 
passenger numbers, house prices, unemployment, traffic, and pollution would be 
straightforward. Drawing causal inference from such an estimator, however, would 
not be appropriate: variation in the regional measures of each dependent variable is 
likely determined mostly by observed and unobserved factors other than the Oyster 
expansion. We must therefore construct a counterfactual measure of what would 
have happened to treated stations (those that were subject to Oyster expansion) in 
the absence of treatment. One approach would be to use difference in difference 
estimation, using OLS to compare changes in the evolution of outcome variables in 
treated compared to untreated stations after each expansion. The key challenge with 
this method is the selection of stations to use as a control group: our full sample 
contains 14 treated and 2,541 untreated stations. Untreated stations would need to 
be selected such that they (a) are characteristically similar to those stations that 
received Oyster in terms of observables that may predict responsiveness to the 
policy (e.g. distance from Central London, rurality, socio-economic characteristics, 
etc.), and (b) exhibit pre-treatment trends in the outcome variable that are not 
statistically different from the respective treated station (Autor, 2003). This would 
involve designing a formal selection process for control stations, in turn leading to 
the risk that results are driven by the way in which controls are chosen (Abadie, 
Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010), or specification searching (Caudill & Holcombe, 
1999) (Vivalt, 2019). Instead, we follow Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003) and use the 
Synthetic Control Method (SCM) data-driven procedure to select a weighted 
combination of untreated stations to form a comparison group for each treated unit.  
 
We firstly utilise the random nature of the timing of the various extensions to argue 
that the extensions analysed represent a natural experiment. During the initial 
2009/10 introduction of Oyster onto National Rail within existing London Travel 
Zones, it was not possible to introduce Oyster onto other London National Rail 
services due pre-existing franchise agreements. Post 2009/10, all LTZ extensions 
were negotiated into the renewal of the franchise agreement for that respective line, 
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in accordance with the then Mayor’s Transport Strategy (Greater London Authority, 
2010). Franchise agreement renewal dates varied by train line, and were 
predetermined before Oyster’s introduction and/or expansion onto National Rail, in 
part dependent on the order in which the various lines were privatised some decades 
previously. The stations explored in this study receiving or not receiving treatment 
in 2009/10 was therefore quasi-random, as was the order of treatment assignment 
post 2009/10. 
 
Formally, there exist ' + 1 stations, which are denoted ) = 1,2, … , ' + 1, where the 
‘treated’ station is denoted ) = 1 and all ) > 1 are donor control stations. The data 
span / periods, and periods denoted /# occur before the respective LTZ extension. 
For each station, ), and time, 0, we observe the outcome variable 1&'. For each 
station we also observe 2 predictors of the outcome, 3"& , 3!& , … , 3(&, which include 
pre-LTZ extension observations of 1&', which are independent of LTZ extension. 
The 2 × 1 vectors 5", 5!, … , 5)*" contain the values of predictors 3"& , 3!& , … , 3(&, 
and the 2 × ) matrix 5# = 65!…5&*"7 therefore collects the values of the 
predictors for the ' untreated stations. 1&'+ is defined as the expected post-treatment 
outcome in ‘treated’ stations in the absence of treatment, and 1&',  the observed post-
treatment outcomes in treated stations. The effect of the LTZ extension on treated 






Clearly 1&'+ is unobserved. The SCM method estimates 1:&'+ using one or more 
untreated station that had similar characteristics to the treated station in the 
observed pre-treatment period. The synthetic control group is defined as a weighted 
average of the stations in the donor pool. A synthetic control can be represented by 
a ' × 1 vector of weights, ; = <=!, =-, … , =)*">′, such that: 
 
















&.! = 1, and =& ≥ 0, so synthetic control groups are weighted averages of 
donor stations. Given a set of non-negative constants D", D!, … , D( (the derivation 
of which is discussed later in this section), optimal weights ;∗ =
<=!
∗, =-
∗, … , =)*"
∗ >′ are chosen to minimise: 
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subject to ∑ =&
)*"
&.! = 1, and =& ≥ 0. The estimated treatment effect is therefore: 
 






I = (D!, D-, … , D() is chosen such that the synthetic control ;(I) minimises the 
mean squared prediction error of the synthetic control with respect to 1"'+:  
 





for some 84 ⊆ {1,2, … , /#}.  
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A challenge with SCM is that, unlike regression-based approaches, standard errors 
are not reported, as only one data point exists for both treated and synthetic units 
per time period. We therefore use the technique developed by Cavallo et. al. (2013) 
to determine the significance of results. Significance is determined by carrying out 
a series of placebo tests, by applying SCM to every potential control station in the 
sample, and comparing the estimated effect for the treated station to the distribution 
of the estimated effects for the untreated placebo stations. This procedure generates 
a lead-specific O − DPQRS5 =
∑ ,789:",$%&8;89:",$8<'(")*+
) , where TU",5
>? is the lead Q specific 
placebo treatment effect, and V(∙) is an indicator function. Notably O − DPQRS5 has 
a non-standard interpretation: it reports the proportion of placebo effects identified 
that are higher than the effect identified for the treated unit. Also following Cavallo 
et. al. (2013), we carry out a diagnostic check on the quality of the pre-treatment 
match by reporting the proportion of placebo units which have a pre-treatment 
RMSPE at least as high as the treated unit.  
 
To avoid the possibility of “cherry-picking” predictor variables, that is, researchers 
choosing predictor variables through trial and error which yield significant results 
(see Ferman, Pinto, & Possebom (2017) for a full discussion) we use the same 
predictor variables for the analysis of effects on all outcome variables throughout 
this paper (we also include a robustness check in which all but essential predictor 
variables are dropped, as discussed below). Stations are matched on IMD (2010) 
scores, to ensure the socio-economic characteristics of the LSOA in which the 
treated station resides are similar to the untreated comparison. CAS Ward 
population is used as a predictor, as a proxy for rurality. We also match on 
geographical distance from Central London, as Oyster users are likely to be 
commuters to Central London, so it is important that the comparison unit is similar 
to the treated station in this respect; further, we restrict our sample of untreated 
donor control stations to those less than 25 miles from Central London for the same 
reason; this leave 114 donor control stations to utilise for analysis. Additionally, we 
match on pre-treatment outcomes in two different ways, depending on the 
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specification of the outcome variable. For passenger numbers, house prices, and 
traffic flows, we specify the outcome variable as a logarithm (base 10) of itself, to 
allow comparison of the percentage change in the outcome over time; where this is 
the case we match on pre-treatment trends as per Cavallo et. al. (2013), using the 
Stata package developed by Galiani & Quistorff (2017). In other cases the outcome 
variable is specified in levels, as matching on the absolute pre-treatment value as 
opposed to trends is important (in the cases of unemployment and measures of 
pollution); where the outcome variable is specified in levels we match on mean pre-
treatment outcomes, following Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie, Diamond, 
& Hainmueller (2015), and Kleven, Landais, & Saez (2013).  
 
For robustness, we also report results where we only use distance from Central 
London, and either pre-treatment trends or mean pre-treatment outcomes (for 
outcome variables measured in logs or levels respectively), as predictor variables 
to demonstrate that results are not contingent on the specification (results from this 
specification are provided in Appendix A). For all outcome variables apart from 
pollution measures, the pre-treatment fit is better with the full set of predictors (Pre-
Treatment Diagnostic P-Value is higher); in the case of unemployment, this is to 
the extent that the Pre-Treatment Diagnostic P-Value without a full set of predictors 
is significant (the specification fails the diagnostic test). In all cases, point estimates 
are slightly changed (in both directions), but level of significance is unchanged. 
 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Passenger Numbers 
Table 3.3 and Error! Reference source not found., compare evolution of 
passenger numbers for each zone comparative to the respective synthetic control 
zone. For all zones, the Pre-Treatment Diagnostic P-Value is insignificant 
(indicating that pre-treatment trends are not statistically different between treatment 
and synthetic controls). We identify a large positive and significant impact of 
Oyster on passenger numbers for Zone 7 stations (rising from 0.007 log points in 
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year 1 to 0.057 log points in year 6), and a smaller positive but significant (in years 
2 and 3) impact for Dartford in Zone 8. For Zone A, we identify significant impacts 
in years 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, and a very small but significant positive impact for Zone 
C in year 6. We find a very small negative, but significant, impact in Zone C for 
years 1 and 2 only. Results for Zone 8 (Cheshunt) are of a slightly smaller 
magnitude than Dartford (e.g. 0.009 log points in year 3, compared to 0.016 in 
Dartford), however results are not significant. For Zones A and B, results are 
positive but smaller still, and are not significant.  
 
The significant results for Zone 7 pass our robustness check (see Appendix A), 
remaining significant at the 5% level for years 2-6, and at the 10% level in year 1. 
Results for Zone 8 (Dartford) remain significant at the 10% level in years 2 and 3, 
and all other results are not significant. We therefore conclude that Oyster positively 
affected passenger numbers for Zone 7 stations, and for Zone 8 (Dartford); we 
cannot conclude that it had any significant effect on passenger numbers for other 
zones. 
 
With the ORR data alone, we cannot compute price elasticities from these estimates 
because (a) we do not observe journey origins nor destinations, and (b) we do not 
observe what type of ticket each passenger purchases. However, we can draw 
meaningful inference by observing the percentage price changes resultant of 
switching from paper tickets to Oyster for various combinations of journeys. Tables 
4 and 5 present the percentage discount (in 2019 prices) between Oyster and various 
ticket combinations of paper tickets, for Off-Peak and Peak Travel respectively. In 
both tables, column (1) represents passengers who travel one way, only between 
the stations affected by a particular LTZ extension and the Zone 1 terminus of that 
line; column (2) represents passengers who complete return journeys between the 
stations affected by a particular LTZ extension and the Zone 1 terminus of that line; 
column (3) represents passengers who complete return journeys between the 
stations affected by a particular LTZ extension and another Zone 1 station, and (4) 
represents passengers who complete return journeys between the stations affected 
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by a particular LTZ extension and Zone 1, and make other journeys over the course 
of the day. Columns (3) and (4) are of particular importance empirically as there is 
no reason to assume a journey to/from a particular LTZ extension station will be 
between that station and another station on the same line. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Evolution of passenger numbers for each zone comparative to the respective synthetic control 
zone. The vertical dashed line indicates the time the extension was implemented. The Lead/Lag indicates the 
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 
Zone 7 0.895 0.007** 0.018** 0.018** 0.030*** 0.039** 0.057**       
    [0.029] [0.018] [0.015] [0.000] [0.017] [0.017]       
Zone 8 (Dartford) 0.842 0.003 0.012** 0.016**          
   [0.175] [0.012] [0.044]          
Zone 8 (Cheshunt) 0.614 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.015       
   [0.272] [0.184] [0.184] [0.211] [0.272] [0.184]       
Zone A 0.825 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.012* 0.014* 0.013 0.021** 0.025** 0.026** 
    [0.181] [0.240] [0.107] [0.094] [0.070] [0.129] [0.047] [0.037] [0.029] 
Zone B (Rye House – Hertford 
East) 
0.551 0.002 0.008 0.005             
    [0.320] [0.156] [0.227]             
Zone B (Brentwood & 
Broxbourne) 
0.959 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.006    
  [0.259] [0.256] [0.253] [0.701] [0.310] [0.138]    
Zone C 0.947 -0.007*** -0.004** -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009**       
    [0.009] [0.061] [0.298] [0.307] [0.132] [0.018]       
Table 3.3. Evolution of passenger numbers for each zone comparative to the respective synthetic control zone. The table shows the difference in log passenger numbers between 
the treated stations/zones and its synthetic control for each year after the extension was implemented. The p-values (in parentheses) are standardised and based on placebo tests. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
.
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From Table 3.4, there is very little to suggest the increase in passenger numbers in 
Zone 7 and Zone 8 (Dartford) is driven by off-peak travel, as the percentage change 
in ticket prices resultant of Oyster expansion is not higher in these stations 
comparative to others, in which we do not identify a significant increase. There is, 
however, suggestive evidence from Table 3.5 that the increases in passenger 
numbers identified are likely driven by peak return travellers (i.e. commuters). In 
Column (2) of Table 3.5, by far the largest price changes are for Zone 7 and Zone 
8 (Dartford); this remains true in Columns (3) and (4) (peak return passengers who 
go on to travel elsewhere in London), though by a smaller margin. Our findings are 
consistent with the findings of Oxera (2005), who find demand for rail travel 
between London and the South East to be elastic in the short, medium, and long 
run; we cannot, however, compute precise elasticities for comparison without more 
granular data on journeys and prices. 
 
A potential concern arises from spillover effects from stations treated by expansions 
to stations further down the same line: in particular, positive results could 
conceivably be driven by passengers travelling from further afield by means other 
than rail, to begin their rail journey at a treated station. We therefore propose a 
robustness check, whereby we utilise the same methodology as above to test for a 
treatment effect at untreated stations further down the same railway line. The 
placebo ‘treated’ stations for this purpose are Harlow Mill, Harlow Town, Roydon, 
and Sawbridgeworth; these are the four stations immediately outside of the LTZ on 
the same Greater Anglia service in which we identify a large and significant 
treatment effect for Zone 7. Results of this placebo analysis are presented in Table 
3.6; whilst coefficients for Year 2 onwards are negative, coefficients are very close 
to zero, and none are statistically significant. We therefore conclude that the 
additional journeys for the LTZ extensions identified in the analysis above are not 
displaced passengers from elsewhere. 
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Return, plus Zone 1 
return 
Off Peak 
Return, plus Zone 1 Travelcard 
Paper Oyster Percentage 
Difference 








Zone 7 £7.50  £4.00 -46.67% £11.90  £8.00  -32.77% £16.70  -52.10% £18.90  £12.90 -31.75% 
Zone 8 (Dartford) £9.10  £4.40 -51.65% £10.00  £8.80  -12.00% £14.80  -40.54% £17.00  £12.90 -24.12% 
Zone 8 
(Cheshunt) 
£8.00  £4.00 -50.00% £12.70  £8.00  -37.01% £17.50  -54.29% £19.70  £12.90 -34.52% 
Zone A £8.20  £5.20 -36.59% £11.60  £10.40  -10.34% £16.40  -36.59% £18.60  £18.40 -1.08% 
Zone B £10.90  £5.90 -45.87% £12.70  £11.80  -7.09% £17.50  -32.57% £19.70  £18.80 -4.57% 
Zone C £12.30  £6.70 -45.53% £17.90  £13.40  -25.14% £22.70  -40.97% £24.90  £20.50 -17.67% 






Return, plus Zone 1 
return 
Peak 
Return, plus Zone 1 Travelcard 
Paper Oyster Percentage 
Difference 








Zone 7 £7.50  £5.60 -25.33% £14.10  £11.20  -20.57% £18.90  -40.74% £21.10  £14.00 -33.65% 
Zone 8 (Dartford) £9.10  £7.60 -16.48% £17.60  £15.20  -13.64% £22.40  -32.14% £24.60  £16.50 -32.93% 
Zone 8 
(Cheshunt) 
£8.00  £6.60 -17.50% £14.00  £13.20  -5.71% £18.80  -29.79% £21.00  £16.50 -21.43% 
Zone A £8.20  £6.20 -24.39% £12.40  £12.40  0.00% £17.20  -27.91% £19.40  £24.60 26.80% 
Zone B £10.90  £8.30 -23.85% £13.10  £16.60  26.72% £17.90  -7.26% £20.10  £24.60 22.39% 
Zone C £12.30  £9.60 -21.95% £20.80  £19.20  -7.69% £25.60  -25.00% £27.80  £30.50 9.71% 
Table 3.5. Peak ticket prices when using a paper ticket or the oyster system to travel to the London Terminal stations in July 2019. 
 







Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Placebo Stations 0.337 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 
  [0.847] [0.905] [0.639] [0.549] [0.651] [0.508] 
Table 3.6: Placebo check, specifying  Harlow Mill, Harlow Town, Roydon, and Sawbridgeworth, which did 
not receive treatment,  as ‘treated’ stations in 2012/13.  
 
Given the observed increase in commuting suggested by these results, we now go 
on to investigate whether there is any evidence that other economic outcomes have 
changed using the same synthetic control analysis that may, arguably, attribute any 
observed change to increased passenger flows.  
 
3.5.2. House Prices 
House Price results are presented in Table 3.7, and Figure 3.7; we do not find any 
evidence that inclusion in the London Travel Zone system has any effect on local 
house prices. In Year 3 for Zone 7 we identify a small negative coefficient of -0.011 
log points, (just) significant at the 10% level. Graphically, there does appear to be 
some positive deviation from trend post-treatment in Zone 8 (Dartford), reaching 
0.021 log points in the 3rd year post-treatment, but only significant in that one year 
at the 10% level. The Dartford result is also replicated in our robustness check 
(presented in Appendix A). Elsewhere, coefficients are both positive and negative, 
and not statistically significant, suggestive that there is no causal effect. It should 
be noted that in the main specification Zones A and C fail the pre-treatment 
diagnostic check, however Zone C passes diagnostics in the robustness 
specification and results are broadly unchanged. 




Figure 3.7. Evolution of average house prices for each zone comparative to the respective synthetic control 
zone. The vertical dashed line indicates the time the extension was implemented. The Lead/Lag indicates the 
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 
Zone 7 0.592 -0.007 -0.009 -0.011* 0.000 0.002 0.003       
    [0.427] [0.168] [0.093] [0.986] [0.830] [0.708]       
Zone 8 (Dartford) 0.842 -0.003 0.011 0.021*          
   [0.699] [0.265] [0.071]          
Zone 8 (Cheshunt) 0.796 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 0.004 0.006 0.015       
   [0.496] [0.336] [0.159] [0.496] [0.398] [0.097]       
Zone A 0.097* 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.007 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
    [0.663] [0.775] [0.565] [0.621] [0.926] [0.909] [0.785] [0.961] [0.701] 
Zone B (Rye House – Hertford 
East) 
0.478 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.005  0.013  -0.011        
    [0.894] [0.779] [0.805]  [0.566]  [0.248]  [0.381]       
Zone B (Brentwood & 
Broxbourne) 
0.538 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.009 -0.007    
  [0.910] [0.666] [0.676] [0.801] [0.285] [0.443]    
Zone C 0.009*** -0.037 -0.030 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.016       
    [0.265] [0.265] [0.761] [0.726] [0.912] [0.584]       
Table 3.7. Coefficients in Log Points. Standardised P-Values in Parentheses. 
 




As a clear effect on passenger numbers is identified for Zone 7, and suggestive 
evidence suggests the additional passengers are likely making return journeys at 
peak times (i.e. they are commuters), we also investigate the impact on 
unemployment in CAS Wards affected by the Zone 7 expansion8; results are 
presented in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.8. The pre-treatment diagnostic P-value is very 
high at 0.895, however no significant effect on the local claimant count is identified 
(coefficients are small and positive in Years 1 and 2 post-expansion, and small and 
negative in Year 3; none are statistically significant). This is suggestive that 
including an existing rail link in a London Travel Zone does not significantly 




Figure 3.8. Evolution of jobseeker’s allowance claimant count as percentage of the working population for 
zone 7 comparative to the respective synthetic control zone. The vertical dashed line indicates the time the 
extension was implemented. The Lead/Lag indicates the years after/prior to the extensions and a lead of 1 is 
the first year after the extension (2012). 
 
 
8 This would also logically be true of Zone 8 (Dartford), however the NOMIS Claimant 
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Coefficients are of the same polarity and larger but remain insignificant in our 
robustness specification presented in Appendix A, however the pre-treatment 





Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Zone 
7 
0.895 0.062 0.358 -0.181 
    [0.942] [0.345] [0.344] 
Table 3.8. Standardised P-Values in Parentheses. 
 
3.5.4. Traffic 
As we find no evidence that the Zone 7 expansion decreased unemployment, we 
test the hypothesis that the additional Zone 7 passengers are displaced motorists, 
(i.e. commuters who would have otherwise used the car). We therefore compare 
annual traffic lows within a three mile9 radius of treated stations to those stations’ 
synthetic counterfactuals; we present the results of this analysis in Table 3.9 and 
Figure 3.9. Consistent with Paulley et. al. (2006), we find no strong positive 
relationship between rail pricing and car usage, identifying instead a small, 
temporary, increase in car (and all vehicle) usage in Waltham Cross in Years 2, 3, 
and 4 post-expansion, and a positive (but not significant) impact at Theobalds 
Grove over the same period. Once again, we find similar results in our robustness 
check in Appendix A: coefficients remain small and positive for both stations over 




9 The three mile radius was chosen due to the limitations of the AADF traffic flow data: 
any smaller radius and we have insufficient overlapping support; a higher radius 
decreases the feasibility that it is a policy impact we identify. We offer this in 
conjunction with the pollution analysis below, which are together supportive of our 
conclusions.  













































































Table 3.9. Coefficients in Log Points. Standardised P-Values in Parentheses 
 
The reasoning behind the small increase in traffic flows is unclear. It is of course 
feasible that these results are is driven by vehicles dropping passengers off at the 
station itself. Our test for spillovers to stations further down the line in Passenger 
Numbers analysis above rules out the possibility that these are passengers who are 
now driving for part of their journey to avoid having to purchase a paper ticket for 
that part of their journey. It is also the case that at a similar time, the nearby M25 
motorway was undergoing major improvement works (Highways England, 2015), 
forcing traffic onto local roads; this is perhaps a more satisfactory explanation, in 
view of the identified increase in car usage being only temporary for both stations. 




Figure 3.9. Evolution of the number of cars (left figures) and all vehicles (right figures) in a three miles 
radius around the stations for zone 7 comparative to the respective synthetic control zone. The vertical 
dashed line indicates the time the extension was implemented. The Lead/Lag indicates the years after/prior to 
the extensions and a lead of 1 is the first year after the extension (2012). 
 
3.5.5. Pollution 
Pollution results are presented in Table 3.10, and in Figures 3.10 and 3.11 for Zones 
7 and 8 (Dartford) respectively. Pre-treatment diagnostic P-values are insignificant 
in all cases with the exception of PM!.# for Zone 7. Excluding PM!.#, coefficients 
on all measured pollutants are negative in all years for Zone 7, and are not 
significant. For Zone 8 (Dartford), coefficients on Nitrogen Dioxide and Nitrogen 
Oxide are similarly negative and insignificant for all years. Small positive impacts 
are identified for PM!.# and PM$% measures of particulate matter in Year 3; these 
are not replicated in the robustness check presented in Appendix A (in which the 
pre-treatment diagnostic P-value is higher for these measures only), and as such 
should be treated as idiosyncratic. 
 
This is consistent with our findings in the previous section, and the literature, in that 
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
 NO2 0.278 -0.519 -0.632 -0.706 -0.406 -1.119 -0.303 
    [0.595] [0.644] [0.627] [0.729] [0.487] [0.711] 
 NOX 0.185 -2.519 -3.313 -3.834 -2.732 -5.170 -2.619 






 PM10 0.138 -0.006 -0.153 0.007 -0.375 -0.600 -0.217 
   [0.832] [0.791] [0.927] [0.596] [0.229] [0.700] 
 PM2.5 0.028** 0.149 0.031 0.150 -0.211 -0.326 0.124 
    [0.800] [0.984] [0.828] [0.773] [0.648] [0.722] 
 NO2 0.105 -1.993 -2.944 -1.424    
    [0.184] [0.228] [0.491]    
 NOX 0.105 -3.276 -6.408 -2.544    
Zone 8     [0.263] [0.236] [0.552]    
(Dartfor
d) 
PM10 0.614 0.219 0.849* 0.826**    
   [0.737] [0.053] [0.044]    
 PM2.5 0.518 0.343 0.656 0.606**    
    [0.500] [0.158] [0.035]    
Table 3.10. Standardised P-Values in Parentheses 
 




Figure 3.10. Evolution of air quality measures for zone 7 comparative to the respective synthetic control 
zone. The vertical dashed line indicates the time the extension was implemented. The Lead/Lag indicates the 
years after/prior to the extensions and a lead of 1 is the first year after the extension (2012). 
 
Figure 3.11. Evolution of air quality measures for zone 8 (Dartford) comparative to the respective synthetic 
control zone. The vertical dashed line indicates the time the extension was implemented. The Lead/Lag 
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Our findings suggest that PAYG rail ticketing positively impacts passenger demand 
only where it represents a meaningful reduction in pricing; suggestive evidence 
points to this effect being driven primarily by commuters. We do not find evidence 
that prior LTZ expansions have had any significant wider economic impacts on 
house prices, unemployment, traffic, nor pollution.  
We utilise the Synthetic Control Method for its data-driven approach to the 
selection of control units against which to compare treated stations. The same set 
of predictor variables are used for the estimation of impacts on all outcome 
variables to avoid specification searching; results without predictor variables are 
reported for robustness, and do not suggest the choice of predictor variables 
meaningfully affects our findings.  
 
The ORR Passenger Numbers data utilised by this study is limiting in two ways. 
First, changes in the methodology used to calculate passenger numbers in 2006/07, 
2007/08, and 2008/09 financial years limits the useable pre-treatment period for the 
purposes of our estimation. Second, passenger entries and exits to and from a station 
are aggregated annually at the station level, meaning we do not see 
origin/destinations at the journey level. An extension of this study using the Rail 
Delivery Group’s more granular LENNON data would therefore (a) increase the 
statistical power of results by extending the pre-treatment period by several years, 
and (b) allow for more detailed inference on the types of journeys, and 
characteristics of passengers, who are most likely to change their behaviour as a 
result of a policy change of similar nature. This, in turn, might allow for the 
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3.7 Appendix A 
 






Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 
Zone 7 0.903 0.010* 0.024** 0.026** 0.035** 0.047** 0.069**       
    [0.080] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]       
Zone 8 (Dartford) 0.816 0.001 0.011* 0.018*          
   [0.693] [0.096] [0.070]          
Zone 8 (Cheshunt) 0.518 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.013       
   [0.675] [1.000] [0.693] [0.781] [0.605] [0.316]       
Zone A 0.443 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.008 0.017 0.018 
    [0.284] [0.351] [0.531] [0.702] [0.733] [0.944] [0.596] [0.271] [0.262] 
Zone B (Rye House – Hertford 
East) 
0.752 0.001 0.007 0.003             
    [0.967] [0.305] [0.468]             
Zone B (Brentwood & 
Broxbourne) 
0.974 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.006 0.010 0.011*    
  [0.064] [0.062] [0.080] [0.155] [0.114] [0.069]    
Zone C 0.702 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012       
    [0.289] [0.167] [0.202] [0.219] [0.184] [0.193]       
Table A 1. Coefficients in Log Points. Standardised P-Values in Parentheses. 










Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 
Zone 7 0.168 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.020 0.009       
    [0.852] [0.747] [0.770] [0.451] [0.131] [0.551]       
Zone 8 (Dartford) 0.478 0.005 0.016 0.022*          
   [0.549] [0.177] [0.097]          
Zone 8 (Cheshunt) 0.628 -0.016 -0.013 -0.014* -0004 0.003 0.010       
   [0.115] [0.159] [0.097] [0.664] [0.858] [0.398]       
Zone A 0.024** -0.010 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.012 -0.005 -0.004 
    [0.481] [0.309] [0.187] [0.305] [0.280] [0.388] [0.445] [0.842] [0.951] 
Zone B (Rye House – Hertford 
East) 
0.759 0.004 0.006 0.008 
   
      
    [0.199] [0.006] [0.167]             
Zone B (Brentwood & 
Broxbourne) 
0.380 0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.005 -0.010    
  [0.955] [0.878] [0.537] [0.917] [0.662] [0.398]    
Zone C 0.204 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.001       
    [1.000] [0.681] [0.867] [0.823] [1.000] [0.982]       
Table A 2. Coefficients in Log Points. Standardised P-Values in Parentheses. 
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Zone 
7 
0.065* 0.100 0.296 -0.244 
    [0.853] [0.453] [0.201] 









Station Count Pre-Treatment 
Diagnostic P-
Value 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year5 Year6 
Waltham 
Cross 





[0.404] [0.255] [0.149] [0.096] [0.830] [0.830] 
 




[0.351] [0.330] [0.191] [0.138] [0.511] [0.840] 
Theobalds 
Grove 





[0.074] [0.042] [0.053] [0.043] [0.096] [0.160] 
 




[0.064] [0.043] [0.021] [0.043] [0.053] [0.128] 
Table A 4. Coefficients in Log Points. Standardised P-Values in Parentheses. 
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Zone 7 NO2 0.332 -0.766 -1.236 -1.269 -0.803 -1.523 -0.526 
    [0.406] [0.343] [0.455] [0.475] [0.318] [0.620] 
 NOX 0.234 -2.497 -3.231 -3.400 -2.264 -4.277 -0.039 
    [0.312] [0.231] [0.269] [0.281] [0.256] [0.987] 
 PM10 0.175 -0.546 -0.597 -0.368 -0.493 -0.244 -0.087 
   [0.240] [0.115] [0.558] [0.494] [0.705] [0.929] 
 PM25 0.042** -0.522 -0.525 -0.408 -0.201 -0.042 -0.767 
    [0.204] [0.165] [0.459] [0.863] [0.937] [0.704] 
Zone 8 
(Dartford) 
NO2 0.096* -2.120 -3.091 -0.502    
    [0.246] [0.289] [0.842]    
 NOX 0.105 -2.988 -5.704 -0.355    
    [0.351] [0.368] [0.930]    
 PM10 0.316 -0.392 0.564 0.227    
   [0.561] [0.395] [0.737]    
 PM25 0.105 0.009 0.858 0.419    
    [1.000] [0.316] [0.254]    
Table A 5. Standardised P-Values in Parentheses. 
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4. Risky Incentives in Labour 
Contracts: An Experiment 
 





*Department of Economics, University of Lancaster   





It is not uncommon for lotteries to be used as incentive mechanisms for 
participation in tasks; participation in online surveys is often incentivised at the 
extensive margin by entry to a prize draw to win an iPad, or a large face value in 
vouchers, for example. If would-be participants were offered the cash equivalent 
expected value of such lotteries for their time, it is unlikely they would participate: 
although we know that the expected value is infinitesimally small, we tend to 
neglect the cost of our effort at the prospect of winning a valuable prize Rachlin 
(1990).  
 
But real life examples of such lottery incentive mechanisms are less easy to think 
of at the intensive margin; that is, lottery mechanisms being used to influence how 
much, or how hard, workers choose to work. It is not uncommon for workers in 
particular industries to be offered bonuses in share options, however whilst these 
involve risk they are not a lottery. The idea behind this paper was borne out of 
anecdotal evidence of a sales manager who believed his workers responded better 
to bonuses paid in scratchcards than the equivalent cash face value; was he right? 
In particular, can lotteries be used as an incentive mechanism to induce high effort 
(and thus productivity)? There is an extensive literature within personnel economics 
on mechanisms to induce optimal effort for the firm, which we summarise below 
(Lazear 1986, and Freeman, 1998 among others), though surprisingly little research 
exists on mechanisms through which lotteries might incentivise effort.  
 
One of the most utilised theoretical models in the personnel economics literature is 
the agency theory model, which assumes that a worker (agent) experiences some 
disutility of effort, while the firm (principal) sets a wage that seeks to incentivise 
an optimal effort level such that profit is maximised (Ross, 1973; Stiglitz, 1989). If 
both parties’ incentives are not aligned, this can result in the agent selecting to exert 
suboptimal effort, and thus the firm obtains suboptimal profits. Many solutions to 
this problem have been proposed, however it is often found to be prohibitively 
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expensive for the firm to incentivise effort over and above the reservation level in 
equilibrium, as the cost to the firm of doing so exceeds the increase in revenue.  
 
Various mechanisms have been proposed to optimally incentivise high effort in a 
manner that is profitable for the firm, most notably efficiency wages and piece rates 
(Prendergast, 1999; Ariely et al., 2009; Lazear, 2000; Lazear, 1986). However such 
mechanisms have been found to be empirically problematic for two main reasons. 
Firstly, measuring individual worker productivity is not always practically possible, 
or can be costly to the firm where it is (Freeman, 1998). Secondly, because effort 
is imperfectly correlated with productivity, and it is productivity that is ultimately 
incentivised by the firm, the worker takes on some risk when exerting additional 
effort; to incentivise high effort the firm must therefore compensate both the 
worker’s disutility of effort and the risk the workers takes on (Pendergast, 2002). 
The costs to the firm of incentivising high effort are therefore often prohibitive 
when weighed against the productivity gains.  
 
There is some suggestive evidence in the literature that workers’ effort response 
may be higher where productivity incentives involve risk (Bandiera et al., 2005; 
Rula et al., 2014; Celis et al., 2013). We contribute by reviewing this evidence, and 
testing it in a controlled laboratory experiment. For that, we propose an experiment 
in which subjects are randomly allocated to three treatments, in each of which 
subjects receive a fixed payment for achieving a minimum standard of effort, plus 
a bonus for productivity over and above that minimum standard. In the first 
treatment this takes the form of a piece rate bonus, in which subjects are paid a 
fixed value for each unit of productivity over and above the minimum threshold. In 
the second treatment, the bonus is paid in the form of an individual lottery, in which 
subjects add a value five times higher than the piece rate to their bonus pot with 
each additional unit of productivity, but only receive the bonus with 20% 
probability (such that the expected value is the same as the piece rate). The third 
treatment takes the form of a group lottery bonus, where each member of a group 
receives a lottery ticket with the same expected value as the piece rate bonus for 
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productivity over and above the threshold, and a winning ticket is randomly drawn 
such that one subject wins the entire group bonus pot. Each treatment is played 
across five rounds (with bonuses allocated each round), and subjects can observe 
other group members’ productivity. The experiment utilises a real effort task to 
ensure a strong positive relationship between effort and productivity 
 
We find that (i) lottery incentives are at least as effective as piece rates in 
incentivising effort;  (ii) risk aversion does not seem to drive higher effort in the 
lottery settings (iii) other group members’ performance in the previous period is 
negatively related to performance in the group lottery treatment, but positively 
correlated for individuals with prosocial preferences.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature 
on effort incentive mechanisms; Section 3 sets out the experimental design; Section 
4. presents the results of the experiment; and Section 4 offers a discussion of the 
results, and the behavioural factors driving the overall effect. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
According to contract theory, exerting high levels of effort is fatiguing to the 
worker, such that effort is costly in utility terms; the firm’s output is, however, is 
positively related to effort. The incentives of employees and employers are clearly 
therefore not necessarily aligned, and so firms must design a compensation scheme 
that aligns these interests. This is the essence of principal agency theory. 
 
Various compensation mechanisms exist in the personnel economics literature, 
which attempt to align these interests. Mechanisms such as delayed compensation 
and efficiency wages increase the value of retaining the job to the worker, while 
others such as piece rates and tournaments link compensation to absolute or relative 
performance. Incentives that directly link compensation to productivity are referred 
      
119 
 
to as Pay for Performance, and there exists a substantial literature on the merits and 
demerits of such mechanisms (see Prendergast, 1999; Ariely et al., 2009; Lazear, 
2000; Lazear, 1986; Gibbons, 1987).  
 
There are a significant number of empirical studies on the effect of piece rate Pay 
for Performance mechanisms on worker effort. The main conditions for piece rates 
to be beneficial are low monitoring costs, accurate output measures, and 
heterogeneous ability amongst workers (Lazear, 1986). Freeman (1998) finds that 
a US shoe manufacturing firm, which switched from a piece rate payments to a rate 
per hour, increased profits by eliminating monitoring costs. He concludes that, 
when monitoring costs are high, piece rates may not always be the optimal payment 
method even if they do increase worker productivity. Conversely, Lazear (2000) 
analysed field data from an automotive glass installer which switched from an 
hourly payment regime to piece rate payment, finding a 44% increase in 
productivity under piece rates comparative to rate per hour (although half of this 
gain was found to be due to worker sorting). In this circumstance both wages and 
profit increased. This efficiency gain was largely due to a sophisticated 
computerised system that allowed the firm to directly measure productivity. 
Similarly, Paarsch (1996) finds that tree planters in British Columbia are more 
productive if paid piece rates comparative to fixed wages, although in this case all 
efficiency gains are attributed to increased effort, as there is no sorting effect. In a 
more recent experiment, Bandiera et al. (2005) compare a piece rate payment with 
a relative payment, where workers are paid according to their output comparative 
to the mean output that day; the authors find that piece rates lead to higher 
productivity. 
 
A stream of the literature examines the impact on performance pay on educational 
outcomes. Lavy (2002) examines the effect of performance-based reward structure 
in a non-random sample of schools in Israel. He finds that providing both students 
and teachers with monetary incentives has a positive impact on student 
performance; positive results are also found where only teachers are incentivised, 
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which proves more cost effective. Similarly, Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2009) 
find a positive and significant impact of providing performance-based incentives to 
teachers on student performance. Fryer et al. (2012) examine the effect of loss 
aversion on teachers, by paying teachers an advance for achieving a target student 
performance, and asking them to return the money if this is not fulfilled. The 
authors identify an increased students’ performance on a standardised maths test.  
 
In general, the literature concludes that Pay for Performance mechanisms lead to 
increased productivity in most circumstances. This result can, however, be reversed 
where incentive payments are set at a sufficiently high rate such that workers can 
achieve their target wage with minimal effort (Ariely et al., 2009). However, 
Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul (2005) find no evidence of income targeting.  
 
Although the literature shows that in most cases Pay for Performance mechanisms 
increase worker productivity, surprisingly little attention has been paid to pay per 
performance mechanisms that involve risk. This is perhaps surprising; as Zábojník 
(2002) notes, this has direct relevance to industries in which bonuses are paid in 
share options. Further, recent research shows some suggestive evidence that such 
contracts might deliver greater efficiency gains than piece rates.  
 
Zábojník (2002) shows that if the assumption of global risk-averseness on the part 
of workers is dropped, and a Friedman-Savage quasi-convex utility function is 
instead assumed with respect to wages, the first best contract achieving full 
efficiency in a principal-agent setup is achieved using lottery payments. It is shown 
that in a locally convex section of the worker’s utility function there exists a lottery 
payment with an expected wage lower than a fixed wage achieving the same worker 
utility.  
 
Brune (2015) builds on this hypothesis by comparing the effect of a lottery bonus 
to a piece rate bonus with the same expected value on productivity and attendance 
of workers at a large agricultural firm in Malawi. The study finds a statistically 
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significant increase in labour supply by workers at the intensive margin twice as 
large as that for piece rates. A small and marginally significant (at 10% level) 
increase in productivity is identified for the lottery bonus, though the piece rate 
bonus was not statistically different from the baseline. However notably this result 
could conceivably be dampened by worker fatigue: because workers are working 
more at the intensive margin, the effects of fatigue could conceivably reduce the 
treatment effect with respect to productivity (e.g. see Schor, 1991). There is clearly 
therefore scope for an experiment in which a productivity outcome alone is 
incentivised.  
 
Levitt et al. (2016) examines the effect of financial incentives on student 
performance, comparing a fixed conditional transfer payment to a lottery payment, 
and with varied treatments in which both students and parents are incentivised on 
the child’s exam performance. The authors find that a lottery payment with parents 
as recipients was most effective, whilst a small but significant effect for a fixed 
payment with students as the recipients is also identified. 
 
Another stream of literature focuses on lottery payments for micro tasks. These are 
the papers most related to ours, although we will contribute with a real effort task 
in a lab setting. Rula et al. (2014) compare outcomes in effort and compliance in 
microtasks using piece rate micro-payments and a lottery, where payments were 
made in the form of coffee shop gift cards. They obtain that piece rates had higher 
compliance and user effort, while the lottery treatment achieved higher recruitment. 
However, there is the clear potential for these results to be driven by self-selection 
and heterogeneous preferences over the gift cards. Similarly, Rokicki et al. (2014) 
compare microtask speed and accuracy under competitive payments, piece rates, 
and lottery payments in Amazon Mechanical Turk. They obtained that an 
exponential piece rate payment outperforms a winner-takes-it all piece rate and 
lottery based payments in terms of accuracy, although the authors point out these 
results have potential to be driven by the relatively low value of rewards in the 
lottery treatment.  




Celis et al. (2013) similarly compare a piece rate with a lottery payment for micro 
tasks in Amazon Mechanical Turk, where participants were tasked with the 
digitalisation of pieces of scrambled text. They find that lottery-based payments 
lead to more accurate digitalisation, and workers spent more time on these tasks. 
Furthermore, a third of participants reported to prefer the lottery payment 
comparative to the piece rate.  
 
Our paper attempts to clearly test the effects of a lottery setting on workers 
productivity via a real effort task, and contribute to the literature on financial 
incentives on productivity, more concretely build on the aforementioned small 
stream of the literature on incentives involving risk.  
 
4.3 Experimental Design 
 
This experiment was conducted in the experimental lab at Royal Holloway, 
University of London between 29th November and 5th December 2017. Subjects 
were recruited from various undergraduate programmes at the university, including 
the Economics and Psychology programmes. Each session consisted of a single 
treatment, and lasted around one hour. Subjects were paid a show up fee of £4. 
 
The task conducted is the Slider Task developed by Gill and Prowse (2012a), using 
zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007), whereby participants are tasked with moving 
a number of digital sliders to a particular position10. This task was chosen for most 
direct comparability of results with other real-effort tasks in the recent experimental 
literature (e.g. Gill & Prowse, 2012; Gill, Prowse and Vlassopoulos, 2013; 
Doerrenberg & Duncan, 2014; Gill and Prowse, 2014; Abeler & Jäger, 2015; 
Georganas, Tonin, & Vlassopoulos, 2015; Araujo et al, 2016; Buser & Dreber, 
2016). The task was also chosen due to its advantages over other classic real effort 
 
10 See Appendix 1 
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tasks: it is simple to understand and communicate; unlike other tasks, the slider is 
exactly the same through repetitions; it involves little randomness and there is no 
scope for guessing. Also, there is a strong correlation between effort and 
productivity. The primary disadvantage of the slider task is that productivity is often 
found to be very tightly distributed, the lack of variation making significant results 
difficult to identify (Banuri & Keefer, 2015). This does, however, add power to 
significant results where they are identified.  
 
At the beginning of each session, subjects were allowed into the lab in groups of 
five and each subject was randomly allocated to a workstation. Subjects were given 
around 15 minutes to read the task instructions fully and answer the control 
questions. Once finished, subjects’ control questions were checked individually to 
ensure complete understanding of the task, and any doubts were clarified. A verbal 
summary of the instructions was then read to the entire group. 
 
This real effort task consists of a screen with 51 sliders, all initially positioned at 0. 
Participants were tasked with dragging each slider to position 50 with their mouse; 
the slider could be adjusted to any position between 0 and 100, as many times as 
desired. The goal of the task is to correctly position as many sliders as possible at 
50 within an allotted time of two minutes. Subjects could see a running total of 
correct sliders achieved in the current round, and the remaining time available. Five 
paid rounds were conducted for each treatment.  
 
At the beginning of each treatment, subjects were assigned a subject number and 
randomly allocated into groups of five. Grouping subjects was necessary in order 
to identify peer effects. Each treatment consisted of 50 subjects.  
 
All communication subjects received about their group members was provided in 
terms of subject numbers, thus keeping real identities anonymous. Two practice 
rounds were conducted prior to the paid rounds in order to familiarise subjects with 
the task; subjects’ performance in these rounds did not affect the final payoff. 




Our three treatments differed only in terms of the bonus payoff mechanism. In each, 
for achieving a minimum threshold of 15 correctly positioned sliders, subjects 
received a fixed payoff of 10 ECU (experimental currency units). The payoffs for 
each round were independent, and the subjects received feedback on their own 
performance and the performance of the other members of their group at the end of 
each round. 
 
In the piece rate treatment, each correctly positioned slider over and above the 
minimum threshold of 15 earned the subject a 1 ECU bonus. Each ECU is 
equivalent to £0.30. The individual’s payoff can be expressed as follows: 
 
!!" = #
10 + 1 ∙ ()!" − 15), 	)!" 	≥ 15
0, 	)!" 	< 15
 
 
Where !!" is the payment for subject i in round r, and )!" is the corresponding 
amount of correctly positioned sliders. 
 
In the Individual lottery treatment, each correct slider over and above the minimum 
threshold added 5 ECU to the subject’s bonus pool; at the end of each round the 
subject received the bonus pool with probability 1/5.   
 
The individual’s expected payoff can be described as follows: 
 
1(!!") = 2
10 + [5 ∙ ()!" − 15)] ∙
1
5
, 	)!" 	≥ 15




10 + 1 ∙ ()!" − 15), 	)!" 	≥ 15
0, 	)!" 	< 15
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In the group Lottery treatment, each correctly positioned slider over and above the 
minimum threshold earned the subject 1 lottery ticket with a face value of 1 ECU. 
At the end of each round, all lottery tickets in each group were added into a group 
bonus pool. The computer randomly selected one ticket in every group, and the 
winner earned the whole bonus pool. Hence, there was one winner of the entire 
bonus pool in each group per round. As before, earnings in one round did not affect 
the earnings in the following rounds. 
 





∑ ()!" − 15)#!$%
∙ 5 ∙9()!" − 15)
#
!$%
: , 	)!" 	≥ 15




10 + 1 ∙ ()!" − 15), 	)!" 	≥ 15
0, 	)!" 	< 15
 
 
As is demonstrated above, each individual ;’s expected payoff !	for a given number 
of correctly positioned sliders in round <, (1(!!")) is constant across treatments; 
behavioural differences across treatments are therefore interpretable as a treatment 
effect of the compensation mechanism alone.  
 
There was a 35 second pause in between each round, during which time subjects 
received feedback on the number of sliders achieved by themselves and their group 
members. They also received their personal payoff information, and that of other 
members of their group (including the winner in the case of the group lottery).  
 
At the end of each session, participants were asked to complete a short 
questionnaire, including measure of risk preferences as per Holt and Laury (2002), 
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and social preferences as per Bartling et al. (2009)11. Choices in the questionnaire 
were not incentivised monetarily, and all subjects were paid in cash.  
 
4.4 Theoretical predictions 
 
We assume the subjects’ utility is a separable function =	 = 	>(?(@))	– 	B(@), 
where >(∙) is an increasing continuous concave function, representing that the 
marginal utility is  decreasing in wealth for the individual. @ ∈ {0,1, … ,102} is the 
output produced by the agent, 	 ?(. ) is the compensation (or wage), which is 
increasing in x; B(. ) is the cost of the effort, which we assume to be increasing and 
convex in x. 
  
In all treatments: 
  
?(@) = #
0, @ < 15





In our first incentive model subjects are paid a fixed bonus in the form of a piece 
rate for sliders correctly positioned over and above the minimum threshold. Since 
the piece rate value takes the value of 1 ECU in this treatment, we substitute this 
value into the wage function, which becomes the following: 
 
?(@) = #
0, @ < 15
I + (@ − 15), @ ≥ 15
 
 
We can model the subjects’ decision by the following problem:  
 
MN@&= = >O?(@)P − B(@) 
 
11 See Appendix 2 




Substituting the wage function: 
 
MN@&= = >(@ − 15) + >(I) − B(@)  
 
If  >(I) < B(15), the solution is @ = 0. Note that the subjects will never exert effort 
below 15, since the payment will be 0 and the cost of effort is positive. 
 
If >(@ − 15) + >(I) ≥ B(15) when @ ≥ 15, there exists a solution such that @ ≥
15. Additionally, if there exists a value of x≥15 such that >'(@ − 15) + >(I) >
B'(@), then there exists a solution such that @ > 15. In such a case, the solution is 
given the following first order conditions:  
 
>'(@∗) + >(I) − B'(@∗) = 0 
>'(@∗) + >(I) = B'(@∗) 
 




We propose a second setting where the piece rate bonus is higher but is only 
received with a fixed probability, such that the expected value of the bonus is the 
same as in the previous treatment. Here we can rule out group-effects from the next 
treatment. Since the piece rate value takes the value of 5 ECU in this treatment, we 




0, @ < 15
I + 5 · (@ − 15), @ ≥ 15
 
  
We can model a subject’s decision in to exert more effort as: 
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MN@&= = R · >(?(@)) − B(@) , 
 
Substituting the values used in our experiment R =
%
#  and ? = 1	1S=: 
 
MN@&= = >(I) +
%
# · >O5 · (@ − 15)P − B(@)  
 
If >(I) < B(15), the solution is @ = 0.	Note that, again, the subjects will never 




# · >(5 · (@ − 15)) + >(I) ≥ B(15) when x≥ 15, there exists a solution such 
that @ ≥ 15. Additionally, if there exists a value of x≥15 such that 
>'(5 · @) + >(I) > B'(@), there exists a solution such that @ > 15. In such a case, 




· >′(5 · @∗∗) + >(I) − B′(@∗∗) = 0 
1
5
· >′(5 · @∗∗) + >(I) = B′(@∗∗) 
 




The last setting is a winner-takes-it-all lottery, in which the total prize is the total 
pool of workers’ accumulated bonuses, where the probability of achieving the prize 
is correlated to the rank, but even low performers have a positive chance of winning. 
Here, the expected value for every unit of output is the same as in the piece rate 
bonus. The performance of one subject can positively affect the total prize, while 
increasing her probability of winning at the same time. 
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Since the lottery ticket takes the value of 1 ECU in this treatment, we substitute its 






0, @ < 15
I + R ∙ X9(@) − 15) + (@! − 15)]
*
)+!
Y , @ ≥ 15
 
 
We can model her decision in to exert more effort as: 
 
MN@&= = >(I) + R · >O@! − 15 + ∑ @)
*
)+! (@) , @!) − 15)P − B(@!),  
 
Here, with abuse of notation, we define ∑ @)
*
)+! (@) , @!) −15)as the sum of each of 
the output of the 4 other players in the group, which simultaneously depends on the 




substituting the wage function: 
 
MN@&= = >(I) +
&!
3&!-∑ &"#"$! /&",&!14
· >O@! − 15 + ∑ @)
*
)+! (@) , @!) −
15)P − B(@!)   
 
If >(I) < B(15), the solution is @ = 0. Note that, again, the subjects will never 
exert an effort below 15, since the payment will be 0 and the cost of effort is 
positive. To simplify, we reduce @)O@) , @!P to @) . 
 
If  >(I) +
&!
(&!-∑ &"#"$! )
· >O@! − 15 + ∑ @)
*
)+! − 15)P ≥ B(@!) being x≥ 15, there 
exists a solution such that @ ≥ 15. Additionally, if there exists a value of x≥15 such 
that R′>'O@! − 15 + ∑ @)
*
)+! − 15)P > B
'(@), then there exists a solution such that 
@ > 15. 
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Since we assume that all subjects have the same utility function, the equilibrium 
must necessarily be symmetric. Hence, @! =	@) 	∀ Z ≠ ;, and @! + ∑ @)
*
)+! = 5 · @!.   
 
The first order conditions are: 
 

















	0   
 
 
Assuming the equilibrium is symmetric and all players maximize the same utility 
function, we substitute @! =	@) 	∀ Z ≠ ;, and @! + ∑ @)
*

















This is the same result obtained in Treatment 2, hence @!
∗∗ = @!
∗∗∗. If the equilibrium 
is symmetric, the equilibrium output in the Individual Lottery Treatment is equal to 
the equilibrium output in Group Lottery Treatment. 
 
Now we will proceed to compare the equilibria obtained in each of the three 
treatments. We first analyse these results assuming that the subjects are risk neutral 
and u(@) = @. We also assume the cost of effort to be a quadratic function c(x) =
x:, as the subject becomes tired over time and the cost of producing an additional 
unit increases. 




Treatment 1: >'(@∗) = B'(@∗), substituting we obtain @∗ = %:. 
 










When the subjects are risk neutral, the equilibrium output will be the same in all 
three treatments.  
 
Now we will assume that subjects are risk averse, and have a VNM utility function 
as previously considered. Since solving without assuming a functional form is not 
straightforward, we will assume a concave utility function >(@) = _`@, and a 
quadratic cost function B(@) = @:. 
 
Treatment 1: >'(@∗) = B'(@∗), if we substitute we obtain @∗ =√%: . 
 
Treatments 2 and 3: 
%
# · >′(? · 5@!) = 	B′(@!), if we substitute we obtain  
@∗ =√ %%;. 
 
Hence, when the subjects are risk averse, the equilibrium output in the piece rate 
treatment is higher than the output generated in the either lottery treatment.  
 
Note that we use output @ as a proxy for the subject’s effort. This is because we 
assume the effort is perfectly correlated with the output, hence the employment of 
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4.5 Results  
       
    Periods   
Productivity 
(sliders) 





































Standard deviations in parentheses 




Figure 4.1:Mean slider output in periods 1-5, under Piece Rate, Individual Lottery, and Group Lottery 
treatments. 
 
Figure 4.1 compares mean productivity in each treatment and its evolution over 
time; Table 1 shows the corresponding mean productivity for each treatment in each 
time period, and the associated standard deviations. The group lottery is uniformly 
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more productive than piece rates (though it is shown below that we cannot reject 
the null that the two series are equal); productivity in the group lottery is uniformly 
more widely distributed than piece rates. Both the group lottery and piece rate 
productivity trends are concave, indicative of a decrease in the rate of learning over 
time, and/or fatigue. Participants in the individual lottery are at least as productive 
as the group lottery with the exception of Period 3.  
 
We first conduct Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric tests on 
data aggregated at the group level for each period to test the null hypothesis that 
group productivity in both lottery treatments are drawn from the same distribution 
as the piece rate treatment. The p-values generated are presented in Table 4.2.  
 
Productivity in the group lottery is consistently slightly above, but not is statistically 
different from piece rates in both non-parametric tests when observations are 
pooled by group. Productivity differentials are globally larger for the individual 
lottery, but the null hypothesis of no effect cannot be rejected for any period.   
 
Null Hypothesis Mann-Whitney t-test Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
T1 = T2  0.7624 0.4411 0.976 
T1 = T3 0.7623 0.5072 0.660 
T2 = T3 0.9397 0.7918 0.660 
    
Table 4.2: Mann-Whitney, t, and K-S tests of the null hypotheses of group equivalence.  
 
It should be noted that an established characteristic of the slider task is that variation 
in productivity is typically very tightly distributed, such that significant results are 
hard to identify (e.g. Banuri & Keefer, 2015); this problem is compounded by the 
within-group variation lost when pooling across groups.  
 
In the ensuing analysis we therefore further employ various parametric 
specifications at the individual level to establish the extent to which the lack of 
statistical significance in the non-parametric tests may be driven by this uncaptured 
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variation; this also allows for the inclusion of relevant covariates to disseminate the 
factors driving the outcomes.  
 
!!" = #$# + #$$&" + #$%&"% +'()&*!&
&'(
&'%
+ +',&-!.)!("+$)+! ∙ *!&0
&'(
&'$




+ +'-5! ∙ *!&06)
&'(
&'$
1 + +'-5! ∙ *!& ∙ !.)!("+$)+! 07$
&'(
&'$
1 + 8!9 + :!̂" 
Equation 1 
 
We estimate various iterations of Equation 1 by OLS. a!< is output (or, equivalently, 
effort) by individual ; in period b. c is a continuous measure for time, measured in 
periods such that c ∈ ℕ	[1, 5]; c: is specified to capture concavity. e!
= is a set of 
treatment dummies, where f = (1, 2, 3) for piece rate, individual lottery, and group 
lottery treatments respectively. hi: and hi>	therefore estimates the differential impact 
of the individual lottery and group the group lottery, comparative to the piece rate 
baseline, respectively. aj?!(<9%)
9!  measures a one-period lag of mean productivity of 
individual ;’s group members, excluding individual ;; k= therefore estimates at the 
margin the impact of higher group productivity on individual ;’s productivity in the 
following period, for each treatment (including the piece rate baseline). K! ∈
ℕ	[0, 10] is a continuous measure of risk aversion as per Holt and Laury (2002), 
such that preferences for risk are increasing in K!; lm= therefore estimates the 
marginal increase in productivity resultant of a one unit increase in preferences for 
risky gambles, again for each treatment. n! is a matrix of social preference dummies 
for revealed social preferences for group envy and pro-sociality, for each individual 
;; oi is therefore a vector of estimators of the impact of each social preference 
classification on productivity, estimated separately for each treatment (including 
the piece rates). n! ∙ e!
= ∙ aj?!(<9%)
9!  interacts social preferences with other group 
members’ lagged productivity for each treatment, pq is the coefficient on the 
interaction effect.  r! is a (s	 × 	)) matrix of s explanatory covariates, consisting 
of a sex dummy, dummies indicating whether the subject is reading Psychology or 
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Economics, and the (self-reported) mean number of hours the subject spends 
playing video games; it is important to control for this variable as whilst selection 
into treatment was fully random, there exist some observable differences between 
treatment groups in characteristics have potential to drive results (see Table 4.3). 
For example, the Group Lottery contains less economics students and no 
psychology students; the Individual Lottery contains a higher percentage of males, 
and fewer participants spend on average more time per week playing video games. 
r! also contains an interaction between Psychology and Sex dummies, to prevent 
the relatively large proportion of female Psychology students biasing the 
Psychology dummy. u!̂< is a residual error term, assumed to be mean zero and 
normally distributed. Across all specifications we estimate Equation 1 using 
cluster-robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity specifically arising 
from heterogeneous within-group variances. Results are presented in Table 4.4. 
 




















































Standard deviations in parentheses  
Table 4.3: Mean characteristics by treatment group. 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
T2 0.79 0.08 2.49 -3.51 -1.29 -1.78 0.47 4.60 
 (1.11) (1.04) (1.93) (2.60) (2.99) (2.88) (4.64) (7.35) 
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T3 0.57 0.51 8.428*** -4.72 3.44 2.72 2.76 14.18** 
 (1.03) (1.00) (1.91) (3.58) (3.78) (3.92) (6.25) (6.12) 
Period 1.886*** 1.928*** 1.12 1.886*** 1.12 1.08 1.13 1.13 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.82) (0.35) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.84) 
Period^2 -0.162*** -0.165*** -0.08 -0.162*** -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Previous_
effort*T1 
  0.142***  0.141*** 0.124*** 0.118*** 0.196** 
   (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) 
Previous_
effort*T2   0.07  0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 
   (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.20) 
Previous_
effort*T3   -0.126***  -0.124** -0.100** -0.104** -0.408*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) 
Risk_Pref
*T1 
   -0.550** -0.569** -0.476* -0.610** -0.603** 
    (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Risk_Pref
*T2 
   0.34 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.24 
    (0.37) (0.35) (0.32) (0.33) (0.34) 
Risk_Pref
*T3    0.53 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.40 
    (0.58) (0.56) (0.61) (0.55) (0.54) 
Male  1.997*    1.824* 2.209** 2.555** 
  (1.07)    (1.02) (1.06) (1.07) 
Econ  0.81    0.72 0.39 0.30 
  (1.16)    (1.19) (1.22) (1.22) 
Psycho  -1.04    -0.83 -0.58 -0.52 
  (1.93)    (2.37) (2.38) (2.35) 
Psycho* 
Male 
 -5.477*    -5.751* -5.593* -5.432* 
  (2.96)    (3.19) (3.14) (3.08) 
Vidogame
_hours  0.187*    0.173* 0.13 0.11 
  (0.10)    (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
ProSocial*
T1       3.932*** 5.907*** 
       (1.40) (1.67) 
ProSocial*
T2 
      1.18 1.85 
       (1.87) (5.14) 
ProSocial*
T3 
      2.58 -5.83 
       (3.35) (3.78) 
Envy*T1       -1.33 -0.46 
       (1.34) (2.39) 
Envy*T2       -1.13 -4.68 
       (2.44) (4.03) 
Envy*T3       -0.30 -3.21 




       -0.06 
        (0.05) 






       -0.04 




       0.287*** 




       -0.03 




       0.11 




       0.10 
        (0.09) 
Constant 22.06*** 20.87*** 19.76*** 24.76*** 22.55*** 21.59*** 19.43*** 16.92*** 
 (0.71) (0.84) (1.66) (1.57) (2.27) (2.17) (2.89) (3.14) 
         
Observatio
ns 
750 740 600 750 600 592 592 592 
R-squared 0.048 0.142 0.077 0.071 0.097 0.17 0.188 0.204 
Cluster-Robust (at individual level) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4.4: Equation 1, results estimated by OLS 
 
In specification (1) we estimate Equation 1 without covariates to establish raw 
differentials; similarly to the non-parametric specifications presented above, there 
is no statistically significant productivity difference between either lottery 
treatment and the piece rate. Though not significantly different from zero, point 
estimates for hi% and hi: and small and positive. Whilst the raw differentials are small 
and not significant, this result confutes the standard theory predictions: subjects are 
not found to be adversely disincentivised by risky incentives comparative to a 
riskless incentive with comparative expected value. We therefore add covariates to 
analyse the behavioural factors driving this result.  
 
Specification (2) adds the characteristic control variables in r!. Conditional 
differentials hi% and hi: remain essentially unchanged, however K: increases from 
0.048 to 0.142. 
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Specification (3) adds the lagged term aj?!(<9%)
9!  to the raw differential estimation in 
specification (1). A small but significant (0.142) marginal impact of other group 
members’ productivity in the previous period on current performance is identified 
for the piece rate treatment; a small but significant negative effect of similar 
magnitude (-0.126) is identified for the group lottery. Point estimates of the effect 
of the individual lottery are close to zero and not statistically significant. Inclusion 
of aj?!(<9%)
9!  in (3) does induce a large and significant conditional differential of the 
Group Lottery treatment comparative to piece rates.  
 
Specification (4) adds risk preferences to the raw differential specification. More 
risk-loving participants perform significantly less well in the piece rate treatment 
comparative to their peers (coefficient of -0.55); this is reversed for the individual 
and group lotteries respectively (positive coefficients of 0.335 and 0.527 
respectively), though the lottery coefficients are not significant. Conditional 
differentials hi% and hi: become larger in magnitude and negative when controlling 
for risk preferences alone, but remain not significant. These results seem in line 
with standard theory: those with more appetite for risk perform better under the 
riskier incentive mechanisms, and when controlling for this alone the lottery 
treatments perform worse.  
 
Specification (5) adds both aj?!(<9%)
9!  and risk preferences, and Specification (6) adds 
the full set of characteristic control variables in r!. Covariate coefficients remain 
broadly similar to those in (2), (3) and (4); the Individual and Group Lottery 
conditional differentials, hi% and hi:, become negative and positive respectively, but 
neither are significant.  
 
Specification (7) adds social preferences interacted with treatment dummies, 
n! ∙ e!
=. We find that those with pro-social preferences are significantly more 
productive in the piece rate treatment than their peers by 3.932 sliders per round, 
significant at the 1% level. Pro-sociality coefficients are also positive for both 
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lottery treatments, but remain insignificant. Coefficients on Envy are negative for 
all three treatments, but are not significant.  
 
Finally, Specification (8) adds interactions between the social preference dummies 
for each treatment with lagged mean performance of other group members. This 
addition increases the size of the coefficient on Pro-Sociality in the piece rate 
treatment from 3.932 to 5.907, which remains significant at the 1% level; the Pro-
Sociality coefficient in the Group Lottery treatment becomes large and negative, 
but remains insignificant. This seems to be driven by a significant (at 1% level) 
positive relationship between the prior performance of other group members and 
current performance of those with pro-social preferences (coefficient of 0.287). We 
hypothesize that those individuals with pro-social preferences behave as 
conditional co-operators, exerting higher effort when they observe their peers 
exerting high effort, hence maximizing the prize pot. Accounting for social 
preferences in this way, the conditional differential effect of the Group Lottery 
comparative to piece rates becomes very large (14.18), and significant at the 5% 
level.  
4.6 Discussion & Conclusions 
 
Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction that subjects will exert less effort 
where incentives involve risk comparative to riskless incentives, our experiment 
shows that lottery incentives perform at least as well as piece rates in inducing 
effort. Controlling for observable characteristics, risk preferences, social 
preferences, and prior group performance (including interactions between social 
preferences and prior group performance), we find a large and significant 
conditional differential in performance between the group lottery and piece rates. 
This is compatible with the findings obtained by Celis et al. (2013), Rula et al. 
(2014), Rokicki et al. (2014), and Levitt et al. (2016), where lottery incentives are 
found to have a positive effect on outcomes comparative to riskless alternatives. 




Contrary to the theoretical suggestions in Zabojnik (2012), in which a quasi-convex 
utility is assumed on the part of the agent to assert that lottery contracts perform 
better because of a risk-seeking element in the locally convex portion of the workers 
utility function, we do not find that risk-seeking preferences significantly drive 
performance in the lottery treatments. We do, however, find that more risk-seeking 
agents perform slightly (but significant to 1% level) worse in the piece rate 
treatment comparative to their peers.  
 
The prior effort of other group members is positively related to current period effort 
in the piece rate treatment. This is conceptually compatible with peer effects, where 
there is an imitation effect, or an increase of optimism, arising where a subject 
observes her peers performing well. Another possible explanation for this finding 
may competition effects, where the subjects may conceivably seek to retain or 
improve their group ranking. Nonetheless, the effect for the group lottery treatment 
is not significant. This could be due to the fact that, due to the risky nature of the 
payoff structure, higher effort does not necessarily correspond with higher payoff, 
hence risk aversion may counteract this peer effect. Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2014), 
find that peer effects are greater when subjects are given a choice between two 
lotteries, relative to the scenario where subjects are randomly allocated to one of 
two lotteries. We hypothesize that the illusion of control over the outcome increases 
the incidence of peer effects, which is consistent with both out and Serra-Garcia’s 
findings. Nonetheless, more research would need to be carried out in this area. 
 
We also find that individuals with prosocial preferences are significantly more 
productive than their peers in the piece rate treatment. The converse effect is 
observed in the group lottery treatment, where prosocial individuals perform worse 
than their peers, although whilst the negative coefficient is large it is not statistically 
significant. We hypothesise that this is compatible with prosocial individuals’ 
preference for equitability: bonus payments in the piece rate treatment depend only 
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on an individual’s own effort, so there is no potential for shirkers to profit from the 
high effort of others.  
 
Notably, by design, the total bonus pool in the Group Lottery is positively related 
to other group members’ effort in any given period, though the probability of 
winning is negatively related to other group members’ effort. In this context, our 
finding that prosocial individuals perform significantly better than their peers when 
they observe other subjects in their group exerting high effort in the Group Lottery 
is a powerful result. We hypothesise that prosocial individuals behave as 
conditional co-operators where contributing to the bonus pool is a group effort, 
exerting high effort only when they observe their peers doing similarly in previous 
periods.  
 
It is noteworthy that neither of these results hold true of the individual lottery: the 
conditional differential for the individual lottery is smaller and insignificant; 
similarly the pro-sociality coefficient is positive, but small and not significant, and 
the interaction between pro-sociality and prior peer performance is very close to 
zero and not significant. In the context of the above, we argue that the design of the 
lottery plays an important role in whether a risky incentive mechanism induces 
effort in those likely to respond to it. This supports our findings: it does not appear 
to be risk in itself that induces an effort response that depends on group performance 
for prosocial participants, but rather a mechanism design that incentivises group co-
operation.  
 
Whilst the raw differentials between each lottery treatment and the piece rate are 
not statistically different between groups, productivity in the group lottery is higher 
than the piece rate across all periods. Given the slider task is often found to be 
characterised by tightly distributed productivity (Banuri & Keefer, 2015) there is 
scope for this research to be extended in a field experiment with a real-world task, 
and with a larger sample size. Whilst this means we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the raw differentials between each lottery and piece rates are zero, we do find 
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strong evidence of heterogeneous effort responses, particularly for those with 
prosocial preferences.  
 
4.8 Appendix 1: Experimental instructions  
 
PIECE RATE TREATMENT  
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
You are about to take part in a study on economic decision-making. The study will last 
about one hour. We are very grateful for your participation. You will be paid a guaranteed 
show-up fee of £4 for participating in the experiment. This is independent of your actions 
during the experiment. You will also have the opportunity to earn additional money. The 




In each round, you will see 48 sliders on the screen. 
 
 




Your task is to set the position of each slider to the centre. Each slider is initially positioned 
at 0 and your task is to set as many sliders as possible to 50. 
You have 3 minutes to set as many sliders as possible to 50. 
Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You should use your 
mouse to move each slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as 
you wish. If you click on the slider, it will jump, hence it needs to be dragged. 




Your payment in each round depends on the number of sliders you positioned. If you 
position 10 or more sliders at 50, you will receive a fixed payment of £0.60 per round. If 
you correctly position less than 10 sliders, you will not receive any payment for that round 
(save for the show-up fee). 
After you correctly position 15 sliders, each extra correctly positioned slider will pay you 
an additional bonus of £0.06 each. 
Therefore, if you position at least 10 sliders correctly in all rounds, you can earn a total 




You will play 5 rounds of this task. Before these commence, you will have 2 additional 
practice rounds that will allow you to familiarise yourself with the task. Your performance 
in the practice rounds will not influence your final payoff. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
  




INDIVIDUAL LOTTERY TREATMENT 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
You are about to take part in a study on economic decision-making. The study will last 
about one hour. We are very grateful for your participation. You will be paid a guaranteed 
show-up fee of £4 for participating in the experiment. This is independent of your actions 
during the experiment. You will also have the opportunity to earn additional money. The 








Your task is to set the position of each slider to the centre. Each slider is initially positioned 
at 0 and your task is to set as many sliders as possible to 50. 
You have 3 minutes to set as many sliders as possible to 50. 
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Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You should use your 
mouse to move each slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as 
you wish. If you click on the slider, it will jump, hence it needs to be dragged. 




Your payment in each round depends on the number of sliders you positioned. If you 
position 10 or more sliders at 50, you will receive a fixed pay of £0.60 per round. If you 
correctly position less than 10 sliders, you will not receive any payment for that round (save 
for the show-up fee). 
After you correctly position 15 sliders, each extra correctly positioned slider add £0.30 to 
your bonus pool. At the end of each round, you may receive this bonus pool, with 20% 
probability. 
Therefore, if you position at least 10 sliders correctly in all rounds, you can earn a total 




You will play 5 rounds of this task. Before these commence, you will have 2 additional 
practice rounds that will allow you to familiarise yourself with the task. Your performance 
in the practice rounds will not influence your final payoff. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
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GROUP LOTTERY TREATMENT 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
You are about to take part in a study on economic decision-making. The study will last 
about one hour. We are very grateful for your participation. You will be paid a guaranteed 
show-up fee of £4 for participating in the experiment. This is independent of your actions 
during the experiment. You will also have the opportunity to earn additional money. The 




In each round, you will see 48 sliders on the screen. 
 
 
Your task is to set the position of each slider to the centre. Each slider is initially positioned 
at 0 and your task is to set as many sliders as possible to 50. 
You have 3 minutes to set as many sliders as possible to 50. 
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Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You should use your 
mouse to move each slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as 
you wish. If you click on the slider, it will jump, hence it needs to be dragged. 




You will be working in a fixed group of 5 people. 
Your payment in each round depends on the number of sliders you positioned. If you 
position 10 or more sliders at 50, you will receive a fixed payment of £0.60 per round. If 
you correctly position less than 10 sliders, you will not receive any payment. 
After you correctly position 10 sliders, each extra correctly positioned slider will add £0.06 
to the group bonus pool, and earn you a lottery ticket to win the entire pool. At the end of 
each round, one of the lottery tickets will be selected, and its owner will earn the total prize. 
Note that more lottery tickets implies a higher chance of winning the total prize. 
Thus, if you position at least 15 sliders correctly in all rounds, you can earn a total fixed 




You will play 5 rounds of this task. Before these commence, you will have 2 additional 
practice rounds that will allow you to familiarise yourself with the task. Your performance 




Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
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4.9 Appendix 2: Social preferences elicitation game  
 
We use the social preference game developed in Bartling et al., 2009. Our 
participants are asked to imagine a hypothetical scenario where they are allocated 
with another anonymous participant, and have to choose between two binary 
allocations for each social preference principle. The first allocation corresponds to 
an egalitarian distribution in all games, while the second allocation favours the 
decision maker (other participant) in the prosociality (envy) and costly prosociality 
(costly envy) game.  
All payoffs are in pounds.  
self: other Distribution 2 
self: other 
          (I)   Pro-sociality 2: 2, 2: 1 
          (II)  Costly pro-sociality 2: 2, 3: 1 
          (III) Envy 2: 2, 2: 4 
          (IV) Costly envy  2: 2, 3: 5 
 
For our results, we consider the four principle variables as dummies that take value 
1 when the first allocation is selected, and 0 when the second allocation is 
selected. This task is not monetarily incentivised.  
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4.10 Appendix 3: Risk Preferences elicitation  
 
We use the task developed by Holt and Laury (2002) and measure it as the selected 
amount of non-safe options, hence a higher coefficient indicates a higher risk loving 
preference. This task is not monetarily incentivised.  
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